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By 
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The collection, primary processing, and subsequent sale of shea-based products make 
an important contribution to rural women’s cash income in many of Mali’s shea 
producing areas. Internationally, shea has recently become popular in high-valued 
cosmetics thanks to its therapeutic properties— a deviation away from its historic use as 
a cheap cocoa-butter substitute. For these reasons, international development actors 
have targeted the Malian shea value chain as part of their private-sector-development 
and rural-poverty-alleviation programs and strategies. Information asymmetry in the 
production and marketing of shea has led to a “Market for Lemons” scenario much like 
that described by Akerlof (1970), thereby compromising the subsector’s potential to 
serve as a powerful source of rural income growth and poverty alleviation. A 
combination of tools is used to describe the Malian shea value chain, including the 
“Structure, Conduct, Performance” framework borrowed from the industrial organization 
literature and the “Subsector Studies” approach popular in current export-led 
international development strategies. Analogies from subsectors historically plagued by 
adverse selection and moral hazard are used to identify potential leverage points and 
intervention strategies for stakeholders to help improve shea quality and returns to 
primary producers.  The analysis suggests the Malian government has the potential to 
play an important role in this process as a coordinating body and channel captain, with 
donors and private enterprises playing complementary roles. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In Mali, West Africa, the production and marketing of shea (karité) based products 
make an important contribution to rural women’s cash income in high-yield areas such as 
Koulikoro, Ségou, and Sikasso. Shea butter, referred to as “women’s gold”, is used 
throughout this region as a cooking fat, a “cure all,” and as a beauty product. As a result of 
family income partitioning practices, shea revenues play a central role in children’s nutrition 
and education in many parts of Mali. Several of its attributes make shea popular in 
industrialized nations as a cocoa butter substitute, as a beauty product, and in 
pharmaceuticals (Alander, 2004).
1 Of all 19 shea producing countries, Mali exhibits one of 
the highest levels of local consumption (as a percentage of production) (Lovett, 2004), 
resulting in competing marketing channels—destined for the domestic and international 
markets.
2 
Individual women dry the shea nuts and extract shea butter (oil) for personal 
consumption or for sale on the local market. Increasingly, individual entrepreneurs and 
producer groups (village level associations and cooperatives) are engaged in down-stream 
value-added activities including oil purification, lotion and soap production, and domestic 
and international marketing. Internationally, only a few foreign oilseed processing firms are 
engaged in the subsector and serve both the mass and niche markets for shea butter.
3 
Shea is unique in that unlike many exported African commodities (such as coffee, cocoa, 
                                                 
1 Shea butter is popular as a cocoa butter substitute for its triacylglycerol composition and popular in cosmetics and pharmaceutical 
s for its unsaponifiable components.  
2 These marketing channels are competing in that they compete with one another for inputs of production and for clients in the 
output sector (Staatz, 1997).  
3 The cocoa butter substitute market would be considered a mass-market, while the cosmetics and pharmaceutical markets would 
be considered “niche” markets.    2
cotton and copper), shea-based products are used extensively in developing and 
industrialized nations alike.  Shea therefore represents the intersection of an indigenously 
produced and consumed commodity (Chalfin, 2004) and the modern, evolving and 
changing global agrifood-system described by Boehlje (1999) and others. 
Although the quality of shea nuts and oil is determined by village-level handling 
practices (drying, storage and oil extraction), the quality of Malian shea is only tested and 
remunerated much later down the marketing chain.  In the past decade, the international 
community has observed a marked decrease in the relative quality of Malian shea-based 
products, reflecting the lack of incentives for village-based producers to invest time and 
energy into producing high-quality products. This has led to a decrease in the quantity of 
Malian shea demanded by the international community and the price paid for it— a modern 











                                                 
4 This is anecdotal in that many industry sources and researchers have noted this issue (Chemonics, USAID). Malian shea export 
values and quantities (such as the ones collected and disseminated by the Malian Government or the FAO) are either incomplete or 
unavailable.  For these reasons, a graph depicting the described phenomenon is not provided.    3
 
Box 1 
The Market for Lemons 
George Akerlof (1970) illustrates the issue of payment for quality in the presence 
of uncertainty in the market for used cars. Individuals in the car market purchase 
their vehicles without knowing whether the car is a “cream puff” (good) or a 
“lemon” (bad). Information asymmetry is present as the sellers (agent) have more 
information about the quality of a car than the buyers (principal). As a result, “good 
cars and bad cars can still sell at the same price— since it is impossible for a 
buyer to tell the difference between a good car and a bad car.” In response, 
buyers attempt to estimate the quality of a car offered to them by considering the 
average quality of the cars offered in the market (Varian, 1992). Sellers of good 
cars cannot expect to receive the true value of their vehicles and most, if not all, 
cars traded will be “lemons,” as owners of good cars withdraw them from the 
market. As the price falls, so does quality. In this case, the bad cars tend to drive 
out the good, as it is impossible for buyers to tell the difference between a good 
and a bad car; only the seller knows (Akerlof, 1970). The Malian shea market 
exhibits many of these same characteristics. 
Given its integral role in many rural women’s cash income, international donors, non-
governmental organizations and, more recently, the Malian government, have targeted the 
shea subsector as part of private enterprise and women’s-promotion efforts. Mali’s 
reputation within the sub-region as a source of low-quality shea has, and continues to, 
thwart such efforts, thereby precluding shea from realizing its full potential as a catalyst for 
rural  income growth and poverty alleviation.  
The predicament described above is the motivation behind this study, whose overall 
objective is to identify ways in which to improve the quality of Malian shea and increase 
returns to primary female producers and their rural communities. To achieve this objective, 
a thorough understanding of the structure of the Malian shea subsector is merited.  First, 
this paper presents an overview of the knowledge gap and proposed conceptual 
framework. Second, it describes the structure, conduct, and performance of the Malian 
shea value chain. Third, it presents a series of analogies from other subsectors plagued by   4
information asymmetry designed to motivate lessons to learn and potentially apply to 
Malian shea subsector promotion efforts. Fourth, this paper provides an overview of past 
interventions and proposals for future donor, NGO, and private sector involvement. This 
paper concludes with suggestions for how the Malian government may, in the future, take 

















                                                 
5 A channel captain is an “actor in the sub-sector who takes a major initiative in developing arrangements for improved vertical 
coordination” (Staatz, AEC 841, 2007).    5
II.   Motivation for this Study and Knowledge Gap  
Donors and international development organizations such as USAID (2006), 
Chemonics (2001), and Action for Enterprise (2005) have conducted several shea value 
chain studies. These describe the West African, Malian, or downstream shea subsector. 
Limited attention has been paid to the problems plaguing the Malian subsector’s rural 
sphere—despite widespread acknowledgement of an observable systematic decrease in 
the quality and international competitiveness (and reputation) of Malian shea. These 
studies have largely assumed that market-based incentives will trickle down to the primary 
producer level and concentrate on identifying ways to provide technical assistance to the 
small number of exporters and large wholesalers (a key leverage point) and fail to either (1) 
describe the entire shea value chain, including women’s time-competing activities during 
the integral rainy season; or (2) propose ways in which to alter incentives at the primary 
and secondary producer level to actually improve quality in the rural areas where it is first 
established.
6 
While exporters understandably play an important role in the export of shea and are 
likely much easier to apply leverage to (given their concentrated numbers in either Mali’s 
capital city, Bamako, or other large cities), Mali’s reputation as an exporter of high quality 
shea products depends on village-level activities and dynamics. This study first contributes 
to the available literature on the Malian shea value chain and second to sub-sector studies 
on high-valued and value-added agricultural exports plagued by quality-related issues and 
promoted as part of private sector development schemes in developing regions. 
                                                 
6 A key leverage point is a node in a commodity’s production-marketing sequence at which intervention (by, for example, 
government, international donors and NGOs) can affect a large number of market actors (such as firms and individual primary 
producers) at once (Staatz, 1997).    6
III.   Conceptual Framework 
The primary objective of this study is to identify ways in which to improve the 
reputation of Malian shea butter and nuts on the world market so that the shea 
subsector can achieve its potential as a powerful source of rural income growth and 
contributing factor to poverty alleviation. To do so, it is necessary to understand how the 
subsector is coordinated and identify key leverage points that may be targeted to alter 
the incentives present such that the quality and quantity of shea-based products sold for 
export in Mali are improved. Evidence suggests that Mali’s reputation as producer of 
low-quality shea nuts and butter is in part the result of high levels of information 
asymmetry between marketing actors (resulting in the effects of adverse selection and 
moral hazard). 
The author has hypothesized that one way to improve current market 
performance outcomes (characterized by increasing the quality of shea products and in 
the prices paid for them) is to improve the economic incentives faced by rural Malian 
women to produce “improved quality” shea butter for the high-valued domestic and 
export markets.
7  This may be achieved via structural or institutional change at identified 
key leverage points.  A salient byproduct of this result is augmented returns to the many 
rural Malian women who derive an important portion of their income from this subsector 
year-in and year-out.  
The conceptual framework for this paper consists of a combination of tools 
derived from “structure-conduct-performance” (SCP) analyses adopted from industrial 
                                                 
7 This is consistent with the women’s labor force participation (WLFP) literature, which focuses on effects of incentives faced by 
women through both their wages and opportunity cost (such as household labor) on labor force participation. By analogy, this paper 
focuses on alternative pricing arrangements (wages) on women’s decision to invest their time in “improved” shea production 
methods.    7
organization literature and the subsector analysis approach currently used as the 
building block of many value chain promotion efforts by international development 
organizations in developing regions. Subsector studies are a vertical application of the 
SCP approach. The use of analogies (or analogous experience) drawn from other 
subsectors is consistent with this framework, as it points to how unfavorable 
performance outcomes are mitigated in other subsectors plagued by the forces of moral 
hazard and adverse selection. This research approach was originally proposed by 
Hildreth, Krause, and Nelson (1973), with the idea of making generalizations from “one 
subsector from an in-depth appraisal to another” (French, 1974).  
A. Structure-Conduct-Performance from Industrial Organization 
 
Misaligned market-based incentives faced by primary female producers were 
identified as a major constraining factor to the amelioration of shea nut and butter 
quality in Mali. To understand how such incentives may be realigned, the Structure-
Conduct-Performance conceptual framework has been chosen as the primary 
conceptual framework for this analysis. The SCP analysis approach is appropriate for 
our purposes, as it is founded on the idea that market performance is influenced by the 
structure (organization) and the conduct (behavior) of its participants (Caves, 1992; 
Brandow, 1976; Jesse, 1978). This research methodology was originally developed for 
the field of industrial organization but is used extensively in agribusiness studies and in 
agricultural economics (Caswell, 1992).  
i. Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric information flow is a defining characteristic of the conduct of actors 
within the Malian shea subsector—between rural traders and shea producers, principal   8
and agent, respectively. This behavior has been strongly influenced by the subsector’s 
structure. Together, these characteristics lead to the undesirable market performance 
outcomes mentioned above. The SCP conceptual framework is used to present the 
issue of information asymmetry. The proposed analogies present mechanisms through 
which to potentially remedy the negative effects of information asymmetry through 
changes to the subsector’s structure and conduct.  
B. Subsector Approach 
The area of research on subsector studies is “simply defined to include both the 
vertical and horizontal relationships in a significant part of the food and fiber sector” 
(Shaffer, 1973). This approach has recently been widely used by international 
development organizations, as “value chain promotion” is the corner stone of many 
private-sector development strategies (Altenburg, 2007; USAID, 2007). Such strategies 
increasingly target high-valued or value-added commodities, characterized as a 
deviation away from traditional exports. Often, high-valued commodities are not 
consumed extensively by the population producing and marketing them (such as coffee, 
some fresh fruits and vegetables, and fresh cut flowers), resulting in the promotion of a 
single “for-export” value chain. In contrast, the Malian shea value chain is partitioned 
into two competing marketing channels—one destined for the rural domestic population 
and another destined for the high-income urban and export markets.  
To achieve the paper’s objective, first an understanding of the structure of the 
Malian shea value chain and interactions between various actors is merited. The tools 
proposed by Haggblade and Gamser (1991) for subsector analyses are used to map 
the organization and structure of the Malian shea subsector as part of SCP analysis   9
described above. The results will lead to the identification of key leverage points for 
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IV.   Data  
 
  This study draws on both primary and secondary data. In 2006 and 2007 the 
author had the privilege to serve as a USAID Farmer-to-Farmer volunteer in Mali. As 
part of her assignment she was informally asked to identify why the producer groups 
receiving USAID assistance were not performing as anticipated (in terms of both the 
quantity and quality of goods produced). It was in this context that the author conducted 
informal interviews and mediated focus group discussions with actors throughout the 
value-chain including those directly involved with the USAID program as well as key 
sub-sector actors identified by her colleagues and past Farmer-to-Farmer volunteers. 
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V. The Global Shea Value Chain  
A. Demand Side: Trends in Consumption 
 
  Shea is unlike many African agricultural exports in that it used extensively by the 
producers themselves and domestic and international consumers. Within the producing 
region, shea butter accounts for nearly all vegetable fat consumed by rural populations. 
It likewise serves as an inexpensive alternative to refined imported cooking oils in urban 
settings (Elias, 2003; Fobil, 2007; and Perakis Fieldwork 2007). In Mali, the recent 
closing of several HUICOMA cottonseed oil processing plants (World Bank, 2007) has 
decreased supplies of cottonseed oil (historically used as a cheap cooking oil) on local 
markets, resulting in increased consumption of shea oil among both the rural and urban 
poor.
8 Industrially refined and imported shea products from Europe are purchased by 
high-income domestic consumers and foreigners in boutique-like beauty shops and 
supermarkets found in major cities (Perakis Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007).  
Shea was originally identified during the colonial period as an inexpensive 
substitute for imported palm oil in Western Europe (Elias, 2003). More recently, shea 
has been used primarily as a cocoa butter substitute (CBS) in European chocolate and 
confectionary production.
9 This use alone accounts for approximately 90 percent of 
international sales.
10 The remaining five to 10 percent of international sales are destined 
for the cosmetic and pharmaceutical industries. The latter industries are thought to have 
the greatest near-term growth potential, especially in the US, which does not allow CBS 
                                                 
8 HUICOMA has historically purchased cottonseed cake from the CMDT (Mali’s sole cotton fiber and ginning company) and 
extracted cottonseed oil for sale on the local markets as a locally produced vegetable oil.  
9 Shea has been allowed as cocoa butter equivalent (CBE) for many years in several European countries. In 2000, the European 
Union finalized a directive allowing 5% CBE in the production of chocolates (Directive 2000/36/EC, June 2000).   
10 According to Fold (2000) “The price difference between cocoa butter and CBE (cocoa butter equivalent) is substantial, the former 
being up to five times more expensive depending on the quality of the cocoa beans and the CBE considered.”   12
(Stathacos, 2004) While data on European and American imports of shea are weak, 
evidence suggests that thanks to the forces mentioned above, shea will continue to 
experience important and growing demand (10-20% per annum) in high-income 
countries (Stathacos, 2004). 
Interest from the cosmetic industry is driven by research showing the benefits the 
unsaponifiable components of shea oil as part of women’s daily “beauty routine”.
11 In 
fact, Alander (2004) notes that: “the main reason for the use of shea butter in high-value 
cosmetic formulations is associated rather with the unsaponifiable components” 
(Alander, 2004). As will be discussed in a later section of this paper, the niche cosmetic 
and pharmaceutical markets demand the highest quality products, with food-safety 
remaining an important preoccupation for the European chocolate and confectionary 
industries. This highlights the transition noted by Chalfin (2004) of shea moving from an 
industrial product to a niche market product, thereby creating unique challenges for the 
development of this subsector.
12 
Most recently, shea has been caught up in a series of popular trends (see cited 
publications for a more in-depth discussion). The gender-specific characteristic of the 
shea production process contrasted against the monopsonistic oilseed processors has 
made shea a target for fair-trade purchasing initiatives by a host of socially conscious 
cosmetics firms (Elias, 2003). In industrialized nations, shea consumption has increased 
as a result of consumer shifts away from synthetic cosmetics, a phenomenon referred to 
as the “naturalizing” of consumption and “green” consumerism (Chalfin, 2004; Elias, 
                                                 
11 Unsaponifiables is a group of chemicals credited with giving shea butter its therapeutic properties (Lovett et al., 2005).   
12 Chalfin (2004) notes that exotic or tropical exports often move in the opposite direction—from the particular to the masses. In 
such a scenario, quality requirements would likely start very high and gradually regress. In the case of shea, the opposite has 
occurred (just as in recent trends towards ‘niche’ coffee markets).    13
2003; Fold, 2000; and Stathacos, 2004).
13 Shea is also popular amongst ethnic 
consumers in Western Europe and US (WATH, 2004). Alander (2004) projects that 
shea may also be targeted in the future for its nutritional properties in the field of 
functional foods.  
B. Supply Side: Trends in Production 
Shea trees are indigenous to the “shea belt” region of Sub-Saharan Africa. This 
region spans across nineteen countries and a variety of ecological zones.
14 Shea trees 
are not cultivated, but are rather managed under local and informal land tenure 
arrangements in the region’s agroforestry parklands.
15 Over three million West African 
women participate in the subsector (USAID, 2008). In Mali, where over two-thirds of all 
shea trees are thought to be found (“Etude pour la Promotion des Filières Agro-
Industrielles”, 2001); most rural women residing in the “shea belt” participate in the 
production, processing (handling), and marketing of shea. Although Mali is believed to 
possess the most important shea nut (kernel) production potential, at 250,000 MT per 
year, Ghana is the region’s most important exporter (Lovett, 2004). Available data on 
production and trade levels are poor, and there exists no “world” shea butter or nut price 
(Fold, 2000).
16 
17 Of the total estimated shea nuts collected from the region, over half 
                                                 
13 It has been noted that in the US, meager FDA supervision of what constitutes a “natural product” allows companies to include 
minute quantities of “African” or “natural” shea in their products and still highlight these ingredients on the label (Stathacos, 2004). 
14 Countries within the “shea belt” include (in alphabetical order): Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo and Uganda (Holtzman, 2004).  
15 Agroforestry parklands are the venues of land-use systems and technologies where woody perennials (trees, shrubs, palms, 
bamboos etc.) are deliberately used on the same land management unit as agricultural crops and animals, in some form of spatial 
arrangement or temporal sequence. In agroforestry systems there are both ecological and economic interactions between the 
different components (Bonkoungou, et al., 1994). 
16 References to several of the studies conducted by USAID’s West African Trade Hub (WATH) are found in the bibliography to this 
paper and can provide interested readers with approximations of such numbers.   14
are consumed locally. In Mali, this figure is closer to 65 percent (Holtzman, 2004). The 
result is the presence of competing production and marketing channels: one for the 
domestic rural poor and the other for high-income foreign consumers.  
 
Figure 1: The Shea Belt (Sallé, G. et al., 1991) 
 
Two species of shea trees are found within the region: Vitellaria paradoxa (or 
Butyrospermum parkii) and Vitellaria nilotica. Vitellaria paradoxa trees are found on the 
Western side of the “shea belt” (including Mali) while Vitellaria Nilotica can be found in 
the East (predominantly Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan). Oil content and 
characteristics vary greatly within and between species and countries (Maranz, S. and 
Z. Wiesman, 2003; Prokarité, 2007; Sallé et al., 1991; and Vincenzo et al., 2005). 
International cosmetics firms appreciate the Vitellaria nilotica variety  for its  lower 
moisture content and free fatty acid levels (Fintrac, 2002). Civil unrest within production 
and processing zones has recently made this product largely unavailable (Russo and 
Etherington, 2001).  
                                                                                                                                                             
17 Shea prices do generally follow cocoa prices, a reflection of the extensive use of shea as a cocoa butter substitute (Chalfin, 
2004).    15
Three oilseed processing firms dominate (over 95 percent of trade) the 
international shea market, including two European firms (Aarhus-Karlshamn and 
Loders-Crocklaan) and more recently, Fuji Oils of Japan (Derks and Lusby, 2006).
18 
They exert their influence over the African shea market by setting prices (as a function 
of world cocoa prices) and quantity and quality criteria (Fold, 2000; Personal 
communication with Bamako exporters, 2006). These companies usually prefer to 
import whole shea kernels and undertake the refining process overseas. This is 
believed to serve as a quality control mechanism, as the quality of shea butter is easily 
compromised by artisanal handling, oil extraction, and storage methods (Harman, J. 
and Lah, K. Personal communication, 2007; Elias, 2003). 
19 
Some companies have established direct or preferred-supplier relationships with 
producers in West Africa (Arhus in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, Fold, 2000; Burkina 
Faso, Elias, 2003). These relationships are designed to help to ensure (1) “Quality @ 
Quantity” for the oilseed processing firms (Lovett, 2004) and (2) differential payment for 
quality to producers.
20 Cosmetic firms generally demand the highest quality products 
available and have also established similar relationships with their West African 




                                                 
18 In 2007, several new firms entered the market (WATH, 2008). 
19 Artisanal production practices are traditional and yield limited quantities (Merriam-Webster, 2008).  
20 “Quality @ Quantity” is a term used by Peter Lovett of the West African Trade Hub (WATH). This describes the requirements of 
the larger traders and oilseed companies: a large quantity of high quality products. Presumably, the large quantity requirement is a 
mechanism for reducing the transaction costs involved with sourcing from a large number of smaller producers.   16
C.  International Institutional Setting 
Asymmetric Institutional Settings at Opposite Ends of the Value Chain 
Institutional asymmetries at opposing ends of the value chain define the shea 
value chain— with informal institutions driving the primary processing of shea products 
in the “shea belt” and formal institutions dictating international trade and international 
consumption of value-added products containing shea butter.
21 To illustrate, currently 
“there are no formal standards governing the exchange of goods between shea nut 
collectors, exporters and cocoa butter equivalent (CBE) manufacturers” (Fold, 2000). 
Historically, informal rural institutions drove all aspects of shea tree protection and 
maintenance, shea fruit collection, shea nut drying and processing, marketing, and 
consumption.  Since the expansion of the use of shea butter as a CBE, there has been 
a sharp rise in the role of formal international institutions—embodied mainly in various 
private grades and standards developed by a handful of foreign oilseed processing 
firms and a growing number of cosmetics firms. These were established with the 
interests of cocoa producers (i.e., the International Cocoa Organization, ICCO), foreign 
oilseed firms and foreign consumers in mind—far removed from the agroforestry 
parklands where shea trees grow and in a language foreign to that of the millions of 





                                                 
21 Institutions here are broadly defined as the “rules of the game” dictating the production, marketing and consumption of shea 
based products.    17
Grades and Standards in the West African Shea Value Chain  
There are currently no public grades and standards for shea butter and nuts. 
22 In 
West Africa, where these products originate, the standards used by Western oilseed 
companies (located in Europe and Japan) are “secrets of the trade,” and CBE 
manufacturers networks of buyers are equipped with “crude quality knowledge” 
(FINTRAC, 1999; Fold, 2000;Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007). These private agri-food 
standards have not been neutral in their effects (Bingen, 2002). Instead, they have led 
to the pejorative labeling of shea made in Mali. While the marketing of shea to 
traditional consumer channels (rural markets) relies heavily on reputation established 
via repeated encounters between buyers and sellers (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007), 
information costs are high in the global agri-food system (Staatz, Lecture, 2007). This 
component of the value chain can also be characterized as exhibiting asymmetric 
market power (concentrated in the hands of village level traders at the micro-level and 
monopsonistic oilseed processing firms at the macro-level).
23 
This scenario is in strong contrast to the formal standards between the CBE 
manufacturers and European chocolate and confectionary manufacturers (Fold, 2000) 
and the worldwide trend toward increasing agri-food quality and safety standards of 
                                                 
22 In Mali, the Ministry of Commerce is responsible for setting and enforcing agricultural grades and standards through the Grades 
and Standards Division (Division de normalisation). To the author’s knowledge, it has not established G&S for shea products. One 
organization, CONOESAM, has been involved in developing grading and to promote an “export quality label” for the regional cereal 
market. ROESAO (Network of Economic Operators in the Food Industry), a regional trade organization, is also involved in creating 
harmonized regional grades and standards. Shea is one of the five subsectors under its mandate (http://www.mistowa.org). 
However, the author is unaware of its presence or effectiveness on the national level in Mali. 
23 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the private grades and standards are not entirely conveyed to marketing agents in the value 
chain by international oilseed processing firms so that the latter can (1) maintain explicit market power and (2) take advantage of 
hold-up type situations. For example, once the goods are produced and exported, receiving firms can make false quality claims and 
pay accordingly because producer groups and exporting agents are often not fluent in the language of international contract law and 
given the perishable nature of shea products, they may lose all value if returned to their country or region of origin (an example of 
asset fixety).      18
international buyers— a reflection of growing concerns of consumers in high income 
countries (food safety standards, and traceability) (Bingen, 2006; Lovett, 2004; Otsuki et 
al., 2001; and Reardon et al., 1999). Today’s construct of shea quality is at odds with 
traditional ones, reflecting the power structures of the global agrifood system. 
The West African Trade Hub (WATH), in collaboration with the United Nations’ 
Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), the Economic and Monetary Union of West 
African States (UEOMA), the Ghana Board of Grades and Standards (GBGS), the 
African Organization for Standardization (ARSO), and the sub-regional project 
Prokarité, has proposed various export guidelines and regional standards for the shea 
subsector in an effort to remedy some of these asymmetries. The Prokarité project 
intends to help “establish regional and international standards of shea product quality, 
with reference both to shea kernel and shea butter, as a basis for enhanced ‘traceability’ 
along the supply chain” (ProKarité, 2006). The stated objective is to help “facilitate 
domestic, regional and international trade in shea nuts and butter” (Prokarité, 2006). A 
verifiable system of grades and standards allows for the description of a product based 
on a specific set of characteristics. The rationale for such an undertaking is presumably 
that “increased standards of quality, accompanied by systematic methods of evaluation 
and verification, theoretically should benefit producers” (Stanford, 2002)—when 
bolstered by government, industry, producers, other marketing actors, and consumers 
alike. Formal grades and standards coupled with quality testing mechanisms 
administered by a credible actor in the value-chain would likely help to overcome many   19
of the information asymmetry issues which have led to both moral hazard and adverse 
selection, and resulting in suboptimal performance outcomes.
24   
To examine this issue, the following paragraphs first discuss some of the pros 
and cons of public versus private grades and standards. Next, they present some 
international guidelines for the export of shea products including (1) a description of 
current quality assurance mechanisms and costs and (2) a list of environmental and 
cultural factors affecting shea quality. Third, they examine WATH’s proposed quality 
benchmarks, and fourth, they describe the CFC’s proposed regional grades and 
standards, which are currently under review with the assistance of UEOMA, GBGS, and 
ARSO, in addition to public and private actors in participating countries. This section 
ends with a discussion of some potential downfalls of the proposed regional grades and 
standards and potential solutions.  
i. Introduction to Private vs. Public Grades and Standards in the Global 
Agri-food System 
 
In developing regions such as West Africa, public grades and standards are often 
very weak. In most cases they are (1) not extensively developed, existing only for a few 
goods, such as highly politicized export crops (cotton) or staple food commodities like 
maize or (2) weakly monitored or enforced. In the case of relatively high-valued 
exported commodities such as shea, global demand for grades and standards in 
downstream marketing activities has often outpaced their public provision upstream 
(Reardon et al., 2001; Reardon et al., 1999).  It is in this context that international 
agribusinesses choose to use voluntary private agricultural grades and standards when 
procuring inputs of production in a developing country context.  
                                                 
24 This is analogous to the role of having a used car checked by a mechanic in Akerlof’s used car market.   20
Box 2 
Grades and Standards: Some Definitions 
 
Standards are “rules of measurement established by regulation or authority” 
 
Grades are “a system of classifications based on quantifiable attributes” (Jones 
and Hill, 1994 quoted in Reardon et al., 2001) with the objective of reducing the 
variance of economically important characteristics within a given lot (Staatz, AEC 
841, 2007).  
 
 
Private food and agricultural standards are created by firms to  (1) streamline 
production and marketing of their goods, in the spirit of traditional grades and standards 
(the transaction cost, TC, approach) when they are sourcing from a wide variety of 
producers (i.e., they are not fully integrated and need to find a way to cut down on TCs 
at various points in the marketing chain),  (2) create more flexibility in responding  to 
consumer demands than public grades and standards allow (Henson and Reardon, 
2005),  (3) respond to increasingly stringent consumer demands for “credence goods” 
(Reardon et al., 2001), and (4) differentiate themselves by creating brand specific 
quality assurance seals.  
Publicly enforced and monitored grades and standards can be characterized as 
being non-discriminatory in that they serve to help level the playing field among actors 
(i.e., they are inclusive). This cannot be said for private (or voluntary) grades and 
standards, which are exclusive in that (1) often only a small number of suppliers are 
equipped for them and (2) they serve as a mechanism for asymmetric market power to 
lead to asymmetric gains (and losses) among value chain  actors (Reardon et al., 1999; 
Staatz, AEC 841 Lecture, 2007).    21
The CFC’s move to establish regional voluntary grades and standards for shea 
butter and nuts and a regional quality certification system is a response to current 
market power asymmetries. Primary-producer groups, marketing agents, donors and 
technical assistance entities (such as NGOs) understand that those engaged in the 
Malian shea value chain are both “price and G&S takers” (Reardon et al., 2001) when 
they export their goods overseas to oligopsonistic buyers.
25 The creation of a regional 
system of grades and standards may help to improve the marketing power of shea nut 
and butter marketing actors in West Africa by equipping them with their own quality 
assurance seal.  
International Guidelines for the Export of Shea  
Grading and sorting based on “traditional” perceptions of quality of nuts and 
butter for sale are practiced at the individual producer and producer association levels. 
International buyers, on the other hand, often require third-party verification of product 
quality when making bulk purchases, in advance of an order. This third-party verification 
requires detailed laboratory analysis signaling a specific quality level to the international 
buyer (Lovett et al., 2005).  The cost to test samples of shea butter varies from 10 to 20 
dollars up to 100 to 600 dollars depending on the entity conducting the analysis and 
criteria verified (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007). Discussions with producer groups, traders 
and exporters revealed that third-party verification typically does not occur in Mali. 
Rather, quality is often determined via laboratory testing in Burkina Faso, Ghana, or in 
Europe (and potentially even after the goods leave the country). In such analyses, the 
                                                 
25 An oligopsony is a market in which there are only a few buyers but a potentially very large number of sellers (Rutherford, 2002).  
In reality, the oilseed processing firms exert both oligopsony market power upstream and oligopoly market power downstream 
(selling their refined shea oil to a large number of diverse buyers).  This component of the international market dynamics is likely 
difficult to overcome given shea’s status as a substitute, with very high price elasticity of demand.    22
characteristics shown in tables 1 and 2 may be verified, including characteristics caused 
by “environmental” and “cultural” factors.
26 
Table 1. Examples of Quality Criteria of Shea Products Based on Biological or 
Environmental Factors 
Fatty Acids  In shea, these are mainly stearic, oleic, palmitic, linoleic, and arachidic 
acids, and they define the “oil profile” and melting point. 
Unsaponifiables  Group of chemicals credited with giving shea butter its therapeutic 
properties (i.e., vitamin content and moisturizing and conditioning 
properties). High levels are preferable for cosmetics and pharmaceuticals.  
 
Sources: Lovett et al., 2005; FINTRAC, 1999; Sénou et al., 2006; Alander, 2004. 
 
 
Table 2.  Examples of Quality Criteria of Shea Products Based on Cultural Factors 
Free Fatty Acids (FFAs)   Indicative of degradation 
Peroxide Value  (PV)  Indicative of degradation, possibly causing 
malodorous ketones and aldehydes. Formation 
often caused by heat, metals (including iron and 
copper) and ultraviolet light.  
Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs)  Form during smoking or roasting over open wood 
fires. PAHs are known carcinogens and regulated 
under US and European food legislation.
27 
Moisture Content  Often the result of the storage method utilized. 
Insoluble Impurities  Usually the by-products of oil extraction. Careful 
filtering can remove or reduce these levels. 
Foreign matter  Resulting from storage, handling or transport 
practices 







                                                 
26 “Environmental” factors consist of components that depend on the environment in which the shea trees grow and their individual 
genetic make-up, while “cultural” factors depend upon how the shea nuts and butter were processed, handled and stored. 
27 EC Commission Regulation no 1881/2006 allows 2 micrograms per kg in a wide range of vegetable oils.   23
Proposed Regional Standards for the Export of Shea  
Benchmark Standards for Shea Nuts  
As discussed previously, individual companies specify their own quality 
standards for purchases of shea nuts. The West African Trade Hub (WATH) and the 
Union Economique Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEOMA) have proposed future 
definitions for public shea standards. Table 3 shows the proposed benchmark for the 
composition of the shea nut required for export, as described by USAID’s West African 
Trade Hub (WATH): 
 
Table 3.  Quality “Benchmarks” for Shea Nuts (Shelled and Unshelled) 
proposed by the West African Trade Hub (Lovett, 2004 and RAISE, 2002) 
Free Fatty Acid (%)  ≤ 6 
Moisture Content (%)  ≤ 7 
Oil/Fat Content (%)   ≥ 45 
Latex (%)   4-10 
 
 
Proposed UEOMA (Union Economique Monétaire Ouest Africaine) Standards for 
Shea Nuts, Kernels and Unrefined Butter
28 
 
As part of current attempts to formalize shea standards in West Africa, the Union 
Economique Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), in collaboration with the United 
Nations’ Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) and the regional project ProKarité, has 
proposed the grades, standards and guidelines shown in tables 4 and 5. These 
proposed public, regional grades and standards are currently under review by 
stakeholders. Once agreed upon, it will be the responsibility of individual countries to 
implement, monitor, and enforce these standards, which would apply to both exported 
                                                 
28 Observations du CTR sur la Norme Régionale de l’Afrique pour le Beurre de Karité (non raffiné) 
http://www.normeskarite.net/CTR_commentaires.html  (2007).  
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and domestically consumed products (Masters, E. Personal Communication, 2008). 
Private firms will continue to be at liberty to impose stricter private standards, and 
although it is understood that each grade will correspond to a different priced good, 
UEOMA does not encourage or plan to be involved in national pricing policies (Masters, 
Personal Communication, 2008).  
 
Table 4.  UEOMA’s Proposed Standards for Export-Quality Physical 
Characteristics of Shea Nuts (un-shelled) and Kernels (shelled)  
  Shea Nuts  Shea Kernels 
Free Fatty Acid (%)   Max 3  Max 3 
Broken/rotten (%)  Max 10/5  10/5 
Fat content (%)  Min 40  40 
Moisture content (%)  Max 9  8 
Impurities (%)  Max 1  1 




Table 5.  UEOMA’s Proposed Grades for Export-Quality Physical 
Characteristics of Shea Butter  
  1
st Grade  2
nd Grade  3
rd  Grade 
Free fatty acid (%)  Max 1.0  1.1 - 3.0  3.1 - 8.0 
Peroxide value (mEq)  Max 10.0  11.0 -15.0  15.1 - 50.0 
Moisture content (%)  Max 0.05  0.06 - 0.20  0.30 - 2.00 
Insoluble impurities (%)  Max 0.09  0.10 - 0.20  0.30 - 2.00 
Source: UEOMA, 2006 
 
 
Three proposed shea butter grades are currently under review by interested 
stakeholders. Ideally, each grade will correspond to a different price to ensure 
compensation for quality thereby beginning to align producer incentives. From table 5, 
unrefined shea butter of 1
st Grade  can serve the needs of the cosmetic and 
pharmaceutical industries, and for direct consumption. Unrefined shea butter 
designated as 2
nd Grade  can serve the needs of the food industry (confectionery,   25
chocolate, edible oil, or as a basis for margarines), while unrefined shea butter 
considered 3
rd Grade can serve the needs of the soap-making industries, or be further 
refined for direct consumption
 (Lovett et al., 2005).  
Discussion  
While the above proposed grades and standards are an improvement from the 
current situation, several questions remain. The analogies presented in section VI 
suggest that special attention must be paid to a host of factors, including (1) the level of 
differentiation between grades based on economically important characteristics to 
downstream marketing actors, (2) how information on these public or regional standards 
is disseminated and to whom and (3) actors’ capacities to meet such standards. 
Together, these will determine the effectiveness of such a system and subsequent 
market performance outcomes (including both pricing efficiency and quality).  
First, although these are regionally agreed-upon grades and standards, 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement will be the responsibility of individual 
countries. Four West African countries formally started this process, and Mali is not one 
of them (Masters, Personal communication, 2008).  It is understood that one of primary 
objectives of UEOMA’s proposed grades and standards is to help facilitate international 
shea trade. These grades and standards will apply to both domestically consumed and 
exported products.  Yet in Mali, the relative importance of the export market is very 
small (between 10 and 25 percent of total production). A scenario in which growers 
producing for the national market are, on the one hand, forced to adhere to new rules 
designed to improve quality, and on the other, receive no tangible economic benefit as 
rural consumers are not yet interested in “paying for quality,” is certainly something to   26
be avoided (Stanford, 2002). Possibly, the development and implementation of a 
system of grades and standards in neighboring countries may be to the detriment of 
Malian shea producers and result in either damaged trade relations or producers from 
neighboring countries selling their lowest quality products in Mali.  
Second, benefits from the transparency achieved by the harmonization of 
regional standards for shea nuts and butter will likely only be accessible to those with 
high levels of market information.
29 For example, advanced and expensive laboratory 
testing is also required to verify the above quality measures. As such, quality is verified 
and remunerated at a point in the marketing chain well beyond the quality-determining 
handlers, thereby reducing the important effects on incentives felt by primary, village-
level producers. Village-level incentives are necessary to improve quality, while 
downstream incentives can only maintain it.  
Third, in addition to the above proposed grades and standards, village-level shea 
quality testing and evaluation criteria as well as pricing arrangements which effectively 
align producer incentives must be addressed for overall quality to improve and for 
village-level primary handlers to benefit. Actors within the marketing chain also need to 
negotiate over which buyers and sellers need to abide by such grades and standards. 
The technical aspects of potential quality testing and verification mechanisms are 
beyond the scope of this paper. The paper’s analogies section provides insight into how 
pricing arrangements coupled with these proposed standards may help ensure pricing 
efficiency for primary village-level handlers.  
 
                                                 
29 Including large producer groups, private firms, and exporters.    27
VI.   The Malian Case 
Although this section describes the subsector’s structure, conduct, and performance 
(SCP) for the case of Mali, much of this material reflects realities in other shea producing 
countries.  
A. Subsector Structure 
i. Biological Characteristics 
 
Production Potential  
Two-thirds of all shea trees are found in Mali (“Etude pour la Promotion des Filières 
Agro-Industrielles”, 2001), with high concentration in the areas of Ségou, Koulikoro, 
Sikasso and Kayes. Annual production of dried shea nuts is estimated at 150,000 tons 
(Derks, 2005), although production potential has been estimated at 250,000 tons (Lovett, 
2004). These numbers are subject to substantial annual variation due to rainfall variability, 
the production cycle of shea trees, and yearly changes in the management of the 
agroforestry parklands where shea trees grow (Sallé et al., 1991). Since 2000, average 
annual exports are estimated at 8000 tons of dried nuts (having undergone primary 
processing) and 500 tons of shea butter (having undergone secondary processing). Data 
are poor, scarce, and often contradictory. The values above should therefore be taken with 
a grain of salt.  
Seasonality 
Shea nut collection and processing are highly seasonal activities. Shea fruit ripening 
and collection coincide with the annual rainy season during which rural women are   28
occupied by on-farm activities.
30 Evidence suggests that the “shea season” varies by 
agroecologial zone (for example, the 2007  “shea season” was earlier in the Southern 
Sikasso region than in the Northwestern Kita region) (Peace Corps volunteers, personal 
communication, 2007). The fruit are highly perishable and must be collected and undergo 
primary processing (or, in most cases, storage) within 48 hours of harvest.
31 This 
seasonality in production in turn leads to variable shea nut and butter prices and supply 
over the course of the calendar year (prices dip over the course of the rainy season, May 
until August, and gradually increase as stocks deplete until the following May) (“Etude pour 
la Promotion des Filières Agro-Industrielles”, 2001; Perakis Fieldwork, 2006).  
Shea Tree Distribution  
There are approximately 94 million shea trees in Mali (“Etude pour la Promotion 
des Filières Agro-Industrielles”, 2001), with large variation in the distribution of trees within 
and between agro-ecological zones (APROMA, 1993; Maranz and Wiesman, 2003; 
Sanou, H. et al., 2006). Zones with particularly high tree density (per hectare) include 
San (up to 40 trees per hectare) and Ségou (up to 50 trees per hectare) in the country’s 
semi-arid region; Dioila, Bamako, Koulikoro and Kita (up to 50 trees per hectare) in the 
sub-humid region; and Kenièba (up to 40 trees per hectare) in Mali’s humid region 




                                                 
30 Women are either directly or indirectly engaged in on-farm activities. Although they may not find themselves in the fields, they are 
actively engaged in complementary activities like preparing materials and food.  
31 The fruit are generally allowed to ripen and fall to the ground prior to collection.    29
ii. Subsector Organization and Actors  
 
Land Tenure Arrangements   
 
Shea trees are implicated in a variety of dynamic land-tenure arrangements.  For 
example, shea trees are often protected under local land tenure arrangements within 
the commons of rural communities (Doumbia and Keita, 1987), with women’s access 
varying by local customs and norms (Elias and Carney, 2005). In some areas, village 
chiefs may allocate shea collection rights, while in other areas, land owners may 
determine who has access to trees in fields and fallow lands (Becker, 2000). The recent 
land allotment (“allotissement”) phenomenon in urban areas may have important 
implications for tree management and conservation as shea trees found within family-
owned plots of land where tree protection and maintenance depends on the importance 
of shea fruit and for household nutrition and income.
32 This phenomenon may in turn 
have a detrimental effect on both women’s access to shea trees and the health and size 
of the shea tree population in Mali’s urban and periurban areas.   
Market Organization and Actors  
The Malian shea subsector can be characterized as pyramid-like, with a large 
number of small and atomized female primary producers, many traders and middlemen, 
and very few exporters. Important gender roles and dynamics are also defining 
characteristics of the subsector. The interdependent relationships between each of these 
actors depend on complementary markets such as the transport sector and credit markets. 
Both the Malian government and the international community (including donors and NGOs) 
have played roles in the development of this subsector, while local research institutions, 
                                                 
32 Under “allotissement”, or land allotment, communal land is partitioned to individual owners.    30
such as the Institut d’Economie Rurale (IER) and ICRAF, have conducted research and 
provided technical assistance to primary producers of shea in Mali, with the objective of 
improving the quality of Malian shea butter and nuts as well as returns to producers. 
 
Figure 2: Stylized Partitioning of the Malian Shea Value Chain (Lusby and Derks, 2006) 
 
High Information, Transaction, and Transfer Costs 
As mentioned previously, the Malian shea sector is plagued by high information, 
transaction, and transfer costs. To date, there is no widely used or accepted method to 
check shea quality at the village level.
33 This has in turn created a lack of trust among 
actors due in part to the current inability of traders to provide differential payment for quality, 
a structural issue which is perpetuated by poor market performance. High physical transfer 
costs (including the cost of overland transportation and tariffs imposed by neighboring port 
countries) contribute to the low prices paid to Malian primary producers and exporters 
(“Etude pour la Promotion des Filières Agro-Industrielles”, 2001).  Shea nut and butter 
producers likewise rely heavily on poorly functioning rural credit markets to make 
investments, buy shea nuts for butter production, and participate in spatial and temporal 
                                                 
33 Please see the previous section of this paper for an in-depth discussion of this point.   31
arbitrage.  Much like shea traders and wholesalers, the informal and high-cost transport 
sector and rural credit market play a linking role between the stages of production and 
marketing.   
The Role of Women 
Historically, the primary handling of shea (including the collection of shea fruit, 
drying of the nuts, and processing of nuts into butter) has taken place solely within the 
sphere of women’s  work. Although revenues from shea sales make an important 
contribution to rural women’s cash income in Mali’s shea producing areas, shea is a 
secondary activity, given women’s competing on-farm or intra-household seasonal time 
constraints, which depend largely on the crops under cultivation (DeGroote and 
Coulibaly, 1998; Elias, 2003; McGlinchy, 2006; Perakis, Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007).  
Women often sell their nuts and butter at the local market to other women, village 
level traders, or to local village-level associations or cooperatives.
34 Individuals are price 
takers, as market information (such as prices) is scarce, they have difficulty participating in 
arbitrage, and shea is usually sold for the sole purpose of paying for household necessities 
such as children’s school supplies and cooking ingredients—a result of household income 
partitioning practices.  
Determining the nature of women’s work and competing time constraints during 
this season is an area for future investigation, as (1) this varies by agro-ecological zone 
and (2) it is possible that developing labor- or time-saving technologies in other 
subsectors may free up additional time for women to devote to shea handling in line 
with the demands of high-income consumers. Such technologies are an especially 
                                                 
34 The role of cooperatives will be discussed extensively in the following sections of this paper.   32
salient issue, as shea has been dubbed an “underexploited resource” (Addaquay, 2004; 
NRC, 2006) because of the labor constraints placed on women during the “shea 
season.” 
The sharp increase in shea prices during the 2007-2008 growing season incited 
an increase in interest in the primary handling of shea fruit and nuts by men in rural 
areas, potentially affecting land tenure and tree management practices. Shea revenues 
the 2007-2008 season permitted farmers to stock their cereals after harvest (as 
opposed to selling them) and selling them later in the season, at a better price with a 
potentially positive effect on household incomes and food security (OMA, 2007). It 
remains to be seen whether the gender dynamics of participation and organization 
change as a result of this “boom.” This phenomenon may compromise women’s access 
to shea trees and their cash revenues from shea sale in the future.  
Traders, Wholesalers, and Exporters  
In Mali there are thousands of traders and about 20 wholesalers who double as 
exporters of shea butter and nuts (Derks and Lusby, 2006). As discussed by Abbott (1987), 
traders play important roles such as putting cash in the hands of primary processors, 
stocking, transporting of products over long distances and identifying potential market 
outlets. In Mali, they link the remote and highly atomized primary village level producers 
and urban exporters and processors, extend loans, and play a role as a technology transfer 
and innovation node.
35 Wholesalers rely on traders to procure shea butter and nuts from 
rural markets. Traders buy from either individual women at weekly markets or from 
cooperative groups and transport, store and resell shea nuts and butter to urban 
                                                 
35 For example, some traders and wholesalers do not pay cash for shea nuts, but rather with capital or expensive (or hard to find) 
complementary supplies (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007).    33
entrepreneurs, exporters and industrial processors. These actors are often part of a well-
connected network and benefit from their highly mobile disposition to participate in temporal 
and spatial arbitrage.  
Government  
The public sector has the potential to play a vital role in Mali, as it is likely the only 
entity capable of playing the role of channel captain or of implementing a national-scale 
campaign for improving the quality (and reputation) of Malian shea. The Malian government 
has exhibited some recent interest in developing the shea subsector. However, efforts have 
been relatively hands-off when compared to Burkina Faso since the mid 1990s (see the 
Analogies section of this paper for an in depth discussion of the shea in Burkina Faso). 
Activities funded by the Malian government have been in the areas of cooperative 
organization, capital investment, and research. Efforts have been dispersed and not part of 
coherent or comprehensive plans to improve the subsector’s performance outcomes on a 
national scale.  
Through intervention at the producer group level (a key leverage point), Œuvre 
Malienne d'Aide à la Femme et à l'Enfant au Sahel (OMAFES) originally promoted the 
organization of cooperatives in this subsector in the late 1990s-early 2000s. The Ministère 
de la Promotion de la Femme et de l’Enfant (MPFEF) has recently supported cooperatives 
in the production and marketing of industrial-grade shea butter in highly centralized areas 
(Malécaux, personal communication, 2007). The high cost relative to quality of industrially 
manufactured Malian shea butter precludes it from being competitive on the international 
market.
36 The Institute d’Economie Rurale (IER), a research arm of the Malian government, 
                                                 
36 For example, many of the factories shut down regularly due to high energy costs.   34
has worked toward developing solar shea nut dryers, improved shea tree varieties, and 
village-level quality testing mechanisms. These efforts are still in the experimental phase.  
Donors and Non-Governmental Actors  
The international community (including donors and donor-funded NGOs) has 
promoted the Malian shea value chain for many years.  Activities include: (1) organizing 
women into producer cooperatives and federated unions of cooperatives; (2) providing 
primary producers with information regarding the processing methods required to produce 
export quality butter as well as the credit and capital required to do so; (3) providing 
exporters with technical training in the areas of quality assurance, creating business 
linkages with foreign buyers, and identifying markets; (4) assisting with research in the 
areas of improved shea tree varieties and village level quality testing mechanisms; (5) 
agroforestry parkland management and tree maintenance; and (6) alternative shea product 
development (such as soaps and lotions). Donor- and NGO-funded activities are generally 
very geographically focused—designated for projects in specific regions of the country. For 
this reason, they are not included in the subsector map provided below.  Their presence is 
nevertheless felt by actors at all levels of the value chain.   
Marketing Channels 
  The majority of Malian shea is produced by women for the purpose of household 
consumption and is not marketed. Holtzman (2004) estimates that less than 35 percent of 
shea products produced in Mali are exported.  The author has identified several marketing 
channels for individual producers, cooperatives, traders and exporters in Table 6 (Perakis, 
Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007).  Primary producers sell their products to local cooperatives or 
at village-level markets to traders or directly to rural consumers. Unions rely on many of the   35
same marketing channels, although they appear to be more export-oriented. These actors 
may also further processing shea butter into soap for sale on the domestic market to either 
high-income consumers who shop in boutiques, urban sales kiosks or supermarkets, or to 
local hotels.
37 Currently, many Malian hotels provide complimentary Burkinabé soaps, 
making this a potentially lucrative market.  Consumers purchase shea nuts, butter, and 
shea-based soaps and lotions from individual producers, traders, and cooperatives at 
village-level weekly markets, urban markets, supermarkets, retail kiosks (in urban areas or 
along major roads), and hotels.   
 
 
                                                 
37 The soaps the author came across were artisanal in nature and generally not of “exportable quality,” especially when compared 
to the quality of Burkinabé and Ghanaian soaps available within the region.   36  37
 
 
Actor Gender Location Number Product(s) Channel




Personal consumption, local markets (to invidividual 






Thousands nuts, butter, soap
Local markets (to invidividual consumers or traders), 
traders, exporters, retail kiosks (urban & along major 




Thousands nuts and butter
Private entrepreneurs, exporters, industrial processors 
(limited)
Entrepreneurs & Industrial Processors Male Urban < 100 butter, soap, lotions
Boutiques, supermarkets, hotels, downstream traders, 




Urban < 100 nuts and butter
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Cote D'Ivoire, Senegal, directly to 
European oilseed processing firms
Supermarkets, Urban Boutiques, and Hotels Male Urban <100 butter, soap, lotions Urban elite, tourists and expatriate community
Table 6. Shea Marketing Channels by Subsector Actor
Sources: Perakis, Field notes, 2006 & 2007; Derks, 2005;  Lusby and Derks, 2006  
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iii. Shea Handling and Processing Methods 
 
Although shea trees exhibit high levels of genetic variation, most analysts accept 
that the quality of shea nuts and butter depends first and foremost on the collection, 
drying, and primary processing (handling) methods utilized by rural primary producers. It 
is therefore at the village level that the subsector’s competing production channels 
originate. Given the role of handling methods on final product quality, the following 
paragraphs describe some of the more widespread handling methods. The stages of oil 
extraction are universal—depulping, drying and storing the nuts, and extracting the oil—
and are considered part of the subsector’s structure. However, primary handlers’ 
choices of techniques to carry out these stages are a reflection of the incentives they 
face as a result of market actors’ conduct. Later sections provide details on the 
incentives driving producer behavior and related market performance outcomes. 
Shea Nut Drying and Processing Methods 
Once rural women collect the shea fruit, the nuts are depulped in preparation for 
drying in one of two ways. This may occur immediately when men, women, and children 
consume the fruit as an important source of energy and micronutrients during the lean 
season, when foods stores are depleted (Elias, 2003; Hyman, 1991). The fruit may also 
be stored in piles or buried holes within family compounds or in the fields where many 
women spend their days working. This allows women to collect the fruit as they ripen, 
but wait to begin handling the shea until after the rainy season workload subsides. 
Depulping occurs first via subterranean fermentation, which is known to compromise 
shea quality (Lovett, 2004) as it increases free fatty acid (FFA) levels and encourages 
seed germination.   39
  In Mali, two shea nut drying methods are used to prepare nuts for storage, further 
processing, and marketing: “bury and roast” and “boil and sun-dry.” The nuts are dried to 
either sell or further process into shea butter. These practices are artisanal, leading to 
highly heterogeneous final products.
  
The dominant production channel is for “buried and roasted” nuts and, eventually, 
butter. It involves labor- and time-saving methods for drying and storing shea nuts. With the 
“bury and roast” method, the nuts are depulped via subterranean fermentation. Once 
women’s on-farm workload eases, or the butter is needed for consumption or sale, the 
nuts are then roasted in a chimney style-wood fire oven until they are sufficiently dried 
for storage or additional processing (Figure 4). Regional buyers purchase this quality of 
product, especially during years of very scarce supply (Keita, personal communication, 
2007), to be purified at a later stage of the marketing chain. The final product is dark yellow 
and has a distinct potent smell.  
 
Figure 4: Shea Drying Oven, Cercle de Dioila, Mali (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007) 
 
An alternative processing method, “boil and sun-dry,” is used by some rural women 
and is preferred by exporters and the international community. The oil from nuts that have 
undergone this processing method is called “beurre ameiloré” (improved butter). This 
method is more labor-intensive and sensitive to the availability of additional inputs like clean   40
water and firewood, and it produces mild smelling shea nuts and butter, and embodies 
other physical properties desired by high-income Malian consumers and exporters 
(discussed previously). 
First, the nuts are depulped by hand. Second, the shea nuts are boiled very soon 
after depulping to denature the enzymes present in the nuts, in preparation for drying 
and storage—requiring additional resources including time, clean water, and firewood 
(Lovett, 2004). This may also place additional stress on local water sources, forcing 
some women to travel farther from home to collect water for this process. Third, once 
sufficiently boiled, the nuts are laid out to dry either directly on the ground or on a mat.  
This can be a daunting task, as the nuts must be monitored to ensure that they do not 
accumulate excessive moisture from rainfall—which occurs frequently, as this activity 
coincides with the rainy season. This drying method can take many days to complete 
and requires consistent attention. Once the nuts are dry, the germination process has 
been halted, and the nuts can be stored (Elias, 2003).  
Storage  
Once dried, shea nuts are stored in a host of different receptacles. For example, 
if the nuts are going to be solely used within the household setting, clay storage bins or 
baskets stored inside mud storage huts found within household compounds are used. If 
the nuts are destined for association-level marketing efforts, they are stored in either 
plastic or burlap bags. The plastic bags are usually recycled bags from rice, maize, or 
millet, whereas burlap bags must be purchased. Burlap bags are recommended for 
storing, as they allow moisture to escape, reducing the possibility of pervasive molding   41
(Personal communication with traders, 2007), another source of possible quality 
deterioration.  
Processing 
This section describes some of the characteristics of manual, semi-mechanized 
and industrial shea oil extraction, or butter processing.  
Manual 
Manual, or traditional, shea oil extraction is an incredibly arduous task, requiring 
multiple day’s worth of effort, large amounts of water, and fuel wood (see Elias, 2003; 
Hyman, 1991; Sallé et al., 1991). Individual women may complete the entire process 
alone, but shea oil extraction is often done as a group, involving women (of all ages) 
from within or between households to help “maintain morale” (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2006 
and 2007). Group work inherently creates a monitoring mechanism for women engaged 
in cooperative butter marketing. This process begins with the shelling of shea nuts using 
a large mortar and pestle. Next, the nuts must be crushed. Historically, this was done 
with a mortar and pestle, but today, most women rely on village-level mills.
38 In Mali, this 
costs approximately 50 CFAF (US $0.12) per 1.5 kg of nuts (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2006 
and 2007).
39 The shelled nuts are then heated in a large cauldron and crushed again 
until they turn into a paste (Elias, 2003).  
The kneading process is the next labor-intensive step. Water is added to the 
shea paste and kneaded; kneading is also known as the “rabbatage dance”. This serves 
to separate the nut residue from the foamy oil, which in turn becomes shea butter. Shea 
butter quality and extraction rate are sensitive to the cleanliness of the water used and 
                                                 
38 Most villages have at least one diesel-powered mill that is privately owned and operated (Perakis Fieldwork, 2006).  
39 1.5 kg fills the standard tomato sauce can found throughout the country (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007).   42
women’s kneading methods (Lovett, 2004 and Elias, 2003). Given its time and labor 
intensiveness, it is not uncommon for wealthier women to hire younger women for the 
day to complete this step (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007). The next step, “washing”, has 
been identified as the most water-intensive in the shea butter extraction process. This 
entails placing the separated off-white oil into water, mixing it, again separating it from 
any residues or impurities, and repeating. Elias (2003) noted that shea butter produced 
for personal consumption or local sales is washed three to four times, whereas shea 
butter produced for the international market requires at least five washings. Prior to 
consumption and sale, the shea butter is brought to a boil to clarify and filter it. 
Traditional manual shea nut drying and butter extraction processes are time-, 
labor-, fuel-wood- and water-intensive. For example, Elias (2003) estimated that eight 
hours of women’s time are required, usually over the course of two days, to extract 2.5 
kg of oil from 10 kg of shea nuts. Traditional oil extraction methods typically reach an 
extraction rate of about 20 percent (Addaquay, 2004; APROMA, 1993; Elias, 2003).
40 
Hyman (1991) estimated that 8.5 to 10 kg of fuel-wood are required per kg of extracted 
oil for the manual (traditional) drying and extraction process. Addaquay (2004) 
estimated that processing 18 kg of nuts into butter requires 67 liters of water (3.7 
liters/kg), whereas Mensah (2001) estimated that traditional drying and processing in 




                                                 
40 100 kg fruit yields 20 kg kernels which yields 4 kg of butter via traditional methods (APROMA, 1993)    43
Semi-Mechanized  
  Semi-mechanized oil extraction involves the same steps highlighted above 
(crushing, heating, kneading and washing). The main difference is the scale and the 
increased role of mills at various stages of the oil-extraction process— achieving greater 
extraction efficiency. Export-quality shea butter is likely best achieved using a mill or 
multifunctional platform (MFP) owned and operated by either an entrepreneur or 
cooperative involved in shea butter extraction and marketing.
41 This may (1) induce 
incentives that ensure the machinery is sufficiently maintained, (2) serve as an 
additional source of quality control, and (3) lower marginal costs. For example, when 
women rely on their village’s single privately operated mill, its use is often (1) expensive, 
(2) available only on an ad-hoc basis depending on the character and humor of the 
operator, and (3) kept in unsanitary conditions. The same mill may be used to process 
corn, millet, sorghum, roasted shea nuts, and boiled shea nuts without being washed in 
between uses (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007). And, if a mill or MFP is simply given 
to producers without attaching some kind of ownership rights or residual claimancy, the 







                                                 
41 Please see Box 3 for a discussion of MFPs, their current popularity, and uses.  
42 As the residual claimant, they are more likely to maintain the machinery, as they are the recipient of profits from its use.    44
 
Box 3 
Multifunctional Platforms (MFPs) 
 
 
MFP owned and operated by COPROKAZAN, Zantiebougou, Mali  
Multifunctional platforms (MFPs) consist of a diesel (or biofuel) powered engine, which 
serves as an energy source for various activities including: to operate various types of 
mills and pumps, to charge batteries, and to produce electricity. These are now popular 
amongst organizations particularly focused on achieving the third Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) to “promote gender equality and empower women” (UN, 2008),  
such as the UNDP and UNIFEM, thanks to their labor-saving capacity in time- and labor- 
intensive tasks (such as shea butter extraction) in which women often engage. 
 
  Mills and multifunctional platforms require maintenance and some mechanical know-
how. These machines, as well as various prototypes, have been introduced widely in 
Burkina Faso as a result of public-private-donor partnerships and in Ghana thanks to 
extensive government research into this domain via the cocoa marketing board (Fobil, 
2007). In Mali, experimentation with oilseed extraction units was especially popular 
during the 1980s and early 1990s (Hyman, 1991). Machinery adoption at the time was 
low and maintenance was poor. Today, however, many of Mali’s largest producer 
cooperatives and unions as well as urban entrepreneurs are equipped with mills or 
MFPs that were acquired from donors, government projects, or cooperative profits 
(Perakis, Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007).     45
Industrial Processing  
  Industrial processing methods may achieve up to 80 percent extraction rate 
(Fleury, 1981). However, industrially dried shea nuts and processed shea oil from Mali 
are not competitive on the international market (Derks and Lusby, 2006) due to the low 
quality of shea nuts (i.e., raw material quality) and comparatively high production costs 
including the high costs of inputs, capital, energy, and imported containers used for 
marketing and overland transportation This high cost has dissuaded most major 
investment (including FDI) in industrial processing, although oilseed extraction firms 
such as HUICOMA and SODEMA have ventured into this market in the past.
43 Several 
individual entrepreneurs, such as the Société Commerciale du Sahel (SCS), have 
purchased industrial oil extraction units from India (Perakis, Fieldwork 2007). Although 
many have established direct ties with shea cooperatives (to gain greater control over 
the quality of their inputs), shea nut quality continues to thwart such efforts (Perakis, 
Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007).  
B. Conduct  
The structural issues presented in the previous section have resulted in current 
conduct (or behavior) by subsector actors. This includes the lack of (1) adoption of 
improved handling practices, (2) differential payment for quality by traders, (3) partnerships 
between Malian producers and European oilseed processing firms, and (4) critical 
investments (human, capital or other) by subsector actors. In response to the subsector’s 
                                                 
43 The Ministère de la Promotion de la Femme et de la Famille introduced mechanical dryers as part of its 2004-2010 shea 
promotion project (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2006).  However, these are only available on a limited basis (for example, one must 
somehow be implicated in a Ministry project to access to these dryers) and they rely extensively on electricity availability, which is 
not very practical in rural Mali.  
   46
structure, conduct, and performance outcomes, primary producers engage in cooperative 
organizations, most marketing actors pool their goods, and foreign oilseed firms prefer 
minimally processed shea nuts over butter.  
Handling method choice 
  Primary shea nut handling takes place uniquely within the household sphere, and 
testing for quality is impossible at the village level, leading to the main source of 
information asymmetry, including both moral hard and adverse selection in the Malian 
shea value chain. Women use the labor-saving methods passed down from generation 
to generation (Perakis Fieldwork 2006 and 2007). Some sources suggest variations 
occur along “ethnic lines” (Derks and Lusby, 2006), while others vaguely suggest they 
occur by “zone” (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007).  The method used can vary greatly within a 
village, or even within a household. It is therefore difficult to identify exactly which 
method is practiced, where, and for precisely what reasons. 
  Value-chain changes (Boehlje, 1999) in Mali have been largely driven by the 
evolving needs of high-income consumers at the top of Kinsey’s (1999) demand chain. 
Despite demands by the international community to modernize, labor-saving processing 
methods persist because few economic incentives are present for primary producers to 
change their production practices. The quality demands of the international community are 
at odds with the dominant “bury and roast” production method employed in Mali. This is 
consistent with the observation of Wessen (1998) that: “informal institutions are more 
tenacious and resistant to change since they are perpetuated through the cultural fiber. 
This means there is frequently a tension between altered formal rules, and persisting 
informal institutions.”  Producers behave in a risk-averse manner and are hesitant to invest   47
additional time, energy, and capital if they are not certain to receive differential payment for 
quality.  
  The Malian shea subsector is a prime example of a situation in which “quality cannot 
be distinguished and rewarded and as a result producers make minimal investments in 
quality, since there are no payoffs in doing so” (Wessen, 1998).  Several organizations 
(governmental, non-governmental and donor-based) promote “improved” shea handling 
methods—including shea nut drying, storage and oil extraction methods. Anecdotes 
from producer groups suggest that many donor-funded projects result in situations 
where producer groups receive training, but (1) are not linked with markets with 
differential payment for quality and (2) are paid above-market prices regardless of 
quality. In each of these cases, primary handlers are informed about handling methods, 
but economic incentives often do not induce their use.  
Investments and Direct Marketing 
The current lack of investments and direct marketing reflect high levels of perceived 
risk by downstream marketing actors. Foreign buyers have experienced repeated problems 
related to quality, quantity, packaging, and timing. As a result, producer groups rely 
primarily on large exporters and wholesalers in urban centers to undertake these activities, 
and European clients prefer to purchase shea nuts and process them with modern oilseed 
extraction technologies. This has also thwarted critical public and private investment in 
processing facilities, capital availability and accessibility, infrastructure, and labor-saving 
technologies in the shea sector (Derks, 2005). The performance outcome also represents a 
lack of progressiveness—unlike Burkinabé, Ivorian and Ghanaian cases where major 
government campaigns promote improved handling methods (Lovett, 2004).    48
i. Cooperative Organization 
In response to the structure of the Malian shea value chain, many women have 
joined producers associations or cooperatives. Women may even belong to several 
marketing organizations—a reaction to high levels of perceived risk in “putting all your eggs 
in one basket” or perhaps a response to varied support and technical assistance from 
donors and government projects.  The roles of the cooperatives today include: (1) vertical 
integration, (2) improving bargaining power and economies of size in pooled marketing, and 
(3) improving access to credit, production inputs, and capital. Vertical integration 
(disintermediation) occurs when cooperatives take up one or more upstream or 
downstream activities, ruling out middlemen and potentially increasing returns to 
production. For example, many cooperative groups identify one woman to transport their 
products to a nearby village or larger trader where they can fetch a better price. Another 
example may be in cooperative groups moving into either the marketing of shea butter or 
even more value-added products such as shea soap or lotion.  
Cooperative-level marketing increases bargaining power of individual producers 
(Cook, 1993). In general, individual rural women cannot access credit markets. Other 
production inputs and related capital such as donkeys, carts (used for harvesting the fruit 
and transporting the final transformed products to market), large plastic receptacles, or 
storage sheds (used for storing shea butter and nuts) are nearly impossible for many rural 
women to obtain individually. Cooperatives may be able to address these market failures 
by applying for credit and pooling individual resources as a group. 
Part of what makes the cooperative so important in the marketing of shea is also 
a potential downfall. For example, the pooling of shea-based products is a source of   49
increased bargaining power for cooperative groups. This involves merging the products 
of several primary producers and marketing the combined (pooled) product.
44 Pooling is 
important for association-level storage and marketing efforts, especially those 
attempting to achieve the quantity requirements imposed by marketing agents or urban 
traders. Issues arise when pooling continues despite the failure of certain producers to 
meet the quality standards set by the organization. The end result is twofold. First, 
social dynamics (e.g., a feeling of solidarity amongst women) may deter cooperative 
managers from refusing products of unacceptable quality, resulting in free-rider 
behavior. Pooling of heterogeneous quality products leads to tainted batches of 
marketable products. In a worst-case scenario, the cooperative may receive a bad 
reputation, resulting in lost present and future sales. Pooling also thwarts efforts to 
improve upstream traceability in the value chain.
45 
ii. Payment for Quality  
Village-level traders are systematically unable to provide differential payment for 
quality due to the levels of information asymmetry in the Malian shea value chain. It is for 
this reason they often described as being “exploitative.” Their behavior is, however, simply 
a function of the information set available to them, and likely reflects future anticipated 
marketing costs (transportation and storage). This is a major problem because “when 
                                                 
44 This activity is also undertaken by village-level traders (who purchase from many individuals through small transactions), as they 
too gain economies of scale.  
45 The author is unaware of specific actions taken by cooperatives to access information or technical services regarding improved 
processing methods to ensure high-quality products.  It appears as though many NGOs and some governmental organizations attempt to 
reach the women with such information. The highly immobile nature of rural Malian women may make it difficult for even cooperative groups 
to seek out technical assistance. This is especially the case when seeking such information and services involves traveling over long 
distances.     50
markets do a bad job of distinguishing, certifying and rewarding variations in quality, 
markets will malfunction or even fail to exist” (Klitgaard, 1991).  
  Although primary producers generally do not receive payment for quality by 
village-level traders, there are several noteworthy exceptions to this rule. In the 
following examples, a quality-verification and preservation mechanism (or a successful 
alternative, such as an informal quality-assurance seal) has been developed to allow for 
payment for quality to primary producers. Through these examples it is clear that 
cooperative organization and the direct relationships between primary producers, 
traders and exporters (or entrepreneurs) play an important role in aligning the economic 
incentives facing primary producers.  
Cooperatives 
Evidence from Mali suggests that cooperative organization is a key element to 
ensuring efficient payment for quality to primary handlers. Payment schemes are largely 
based on organization’s member agreement and were constantly updated through “trial 
and error.”
46 For example, at least three unions or federated cooperatives (MPFEF in 
Dioila, COPROKAZAN, and COPROKASI) pay a buyer to verify and purchase three 
grades of shea nuts from members. In the case of COPROKAZAN, three nut grades 
were established: (1) boiled and sun-dried nuts, (2) boiled and roasted nuts and (3) 
buried and roasted, germinated, cracked, or broken nuts. Producers received payments 
of 100, 75 and 50 CFAF/kg, respectively.  In the case of all three unions mentioned 
above, members were given the opportunity to be paid to transform and store the nuts 
in a central location using suggested “improved methods” from donors and technical 
                                                 
46 The producer groups called such member agreements “mandates.” These are terms dictating participation requirements and 
remuneration and are agreed upon by members.     51
assistance organizations such as Prokarité. As mentioned previously, collective work 
acts as a de facto monitoring and quality-assurance mechanism, thereby reducing 
information asymmetry and incentives to cheat. These organizations test the chemical 
composition of their products in laboratories overseas and use the quality certificate as 
a signal to command a premium for quality from local high-income consumers, traders, 
downstream entrepreneurs, and exporters.  
Traders, Entrepreneurs, and Exporters 
Some larger traders, entrepreneurs and exporters have successfully developed their 
own quality-assurance seal by improving information flows between themselves and 
their shea sources. In several cases, shea handling training sessions (formations) 
attended by exporters, traders, and producer groups act as a “quality-assurance seal” in 
the absence of a uniform, accessible, and easily verifiable system of grades and 
standards.  The notion of “repeated games,” via repeated encounters, helps to reduce 
much of the information asymmetry present, as producers know they may be precluded 
from selling to these entities in the future if they shirk. Downstream actors help to keep 
primary handlers up-to-date with follow-up training sessions, illustrations of improved 
handling methods, and informational handbooks published in local languages (Perakis, 
Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007).  
C. Performance Outcomes: Production & Marketing Bottlenecks 
Longstanding international interest in developing Mali’s shea subsector is a 
reflection of the country’s potential as a major shea butter and nut producing and exporting 
country and the important contribution revenues from the subsector could make to rural   52
women’s income. Despite this interest and Mali’s potential, several factors contribute to 
this country’s decreased role and reputation in international shea marketing.  
The retreat of Malian shea product exports is generally attributed to the relatively 
feeble and inconsistent quality and relatively high marketing costs (Derks, 2005). Together, 
these factors have incited high levels of perceived risk by foreign importers and traders 
(Derks & Lusby, 2006). Within the region, Malian primary producers consistently receive 
the lowest prices for their shea nuts and butter (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2006).  Foreign oilseed 
firms prefer to import whole shea nuts (to maintain control over the oil extraction process), 
precluding primary producers from earning additional profits from their value-added 
commodities (the bulk of the marketing margins are gained after the primary products leave 
Mali).
47 
One element of appraising market performance is “price coordination” (Brandow, 
1977). An important aspect of price coordination is “appropriate price differences among 
varieties, grades or locations of products” (Brandow, 1977). High transaction costs and high 
levels of information asymmetry compromise traders’ ability to pay appropriately for quality. 
Some producer groups attempted to adopt improved processing methods, but reverted 
back to their labor-saving production practices because they were not financially 
remunerated for their efforts. This indicator of poor performance in turn reinforces 
suboptimal conduct by players (there is little incentive for primary processors to produce 
high quality products if they are not receiving a price premium for their efforts), resulting in a 
“Market for Lemons.” This dynamic also reflects the interdependent relationship and 
feedback between market structure, conduct, and performance suggested by Jesse (1978).  
                                                 
47 For example, shea nuts may sell for 25 or 50 FCFA/kg (roughly 5-10 cents), whereas a kg of shea butter may sell for between 
400 and 1000 FCFA.    53
  Examples of the frequent quality related problems with artisanally processed shea 
butter (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2006) include: 
(1)  Foreign material and objects in butter—often due to a lack of understanding 
by secondary processors of consumer needs, or a lack of sanitary storage 
receptacles. 
(2)  Inconsistent color or texture—a result heterogeneous handling methods and 
pooling of shea butter and nuts at the village or cooperative level.  
(3)  High levels of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAH)—known 
carcinogens. 
(4)  Acute smell—caused by high free fatty acid levels from (1) unsanitary boiling, 
cleaning, and drying of shea nuts and (2) the labor-saving “bury-and-roast“ 
shea nut drying method.  
(5)  Degraded quality from inappropriate packaging and storage facilities (Derks, 
2005)  
 
Producers are also not specialized in the production and marketing of shea, but 
rather engage in alternative income-generating activities aside from shea (perhaps cotton, 
cereals, maize, or livestock during primary shea-processing periods) (McGlinchy, 2006; 
Perakis Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007). This diversification also reflects social roles in rural 
Mali, as women tend to familial plots (directly or indirectly) during the rainy season, but may 
also be a risk mitigation strategy. Most women’s groups are not engaged in preferred-
supplier relationships with traders (or exporters) and lack insurance mechanisms in the 
case of either (1) a bad crop or (2) receiving very low prices for their goods.  
  Evidence suggests a reduction in the health of the Malian shea tree population.   
Contributing factors include the advanced age of many agroforestry parklands where the 
trees are mainly found, the trees’ slow maturation rate (which has discouraged planting 
and cultivation of shea trees), increased pressures placed on parklands due to 
urbanization, and shifts from communal to private land tenure arrangements (Toufik   54
Ftaïta, 2007; Perakis, Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007).
48  Nouvellet (2006) suggested that 
the cutting of branches and felling of shea trees are an important source of fuel wood for 
the country’s villages and large towns, putting into question the strength and 
effectiveness of tree protection under the local tenure arrangements discussed earlier. 
This deterioration of production capital (trees, which are not owned, per se, but cared for 
under the rural informal land tenure systems) suggests a lack of incentives to maintain shea 
trees in rural Mali.  
One of the rationales behind promoting the production and export of shea as a high-
valued and value-added “non-timber forestry product” (NTFP) is that if the trees are 
valued for their NTFPs, efforts will be made by local populations to increase 
conservation of highly marginalized ecological zones by curtailing deforestation (CIFOR, 
1998). However, placing too much value on such products may incite aggressive shea 
fruit harvesting, thereby exacerbating the exact problems such efforts originally 
attempted to reduce (Wollenburg and Engels, 1998).  
Finally, the word disorganized is often used to describe dynamics in the Malian 
shea value chain. For example, shea products change hands many times before 
arriving in major cities—in part a result of market failures in complementary markets 
such as the rural credit market and transport sector. Many of the planned interventions 
within the subsector specifically aim to reduce the role of traders and middlemen (whose 
activities are viewed as excessive) in the marketing of shea, as they are thought to limit 
                                                 
48 This is consistent with other dynamics in this subsector. The agro-forestry parklands, where shea trees are found, must be 
maintained or monitored to ensure the health of the Malian shea tree population. If there is deterioration in the perceived value of 
shea nuts and butter, a decrease in the willingness of rural populations to care or maintain trees is understandable. This decreased 
interest in shea tree maintenance is highly problematic given the 20-year maturation period of shea trees. There is likewise 
anecdotal evidence that suggests a decrease in women’s access to shea trees due to the partitioning or “allotissement” of land to 
private owners. .   55
returns to primary producers (each time the goods change hands they are marked up). It is 
important to note that although this behavior may be perceived as inefficient, and an 
excessive source of marketing margins, it may be necessary given current market 
realities (for example, the immobile nature of rural Malian women). This underscores the 
importance of understanding the roles of complementary markets (such as rural credit 
and transportation) and actors (in terms of both their actions and risk bearing) and 
identifying a channel captain who will play an organizing and coordinating role in the 
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VII.   Analogies from Subsectors with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
Forces at Play 
 
  As in many markets for high-valued and perishable commodities (Jaffee and 
Morton, 1995), the principal-agent dilemma is pervasive throughout the Malian shea 
subsector. As discussed in previous sections, incentives are misaligned between shea 
buyers and traders (the principal) and primary shea producers and producer groups (the 
agent). Traders and exporters desire shea products transformed using improved 
primary processing methods to sell to either (1) larger traders or (2) major oilseed 
companies. Such high-quality products may (1) improve the traders’ reputation 
(ensuring future trading opportunities) or (2) command a premium on the international 
market (personal communication with exporters, Perakis Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007). 
Primary producers (and village-level producer groups and associations), on the other 
hand, are time-poor during the shea season. Information regarding production 
processes is asymmetric and non-verifiable, resulting in situations of both adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Macho and Pérez, 2001) in the buying and selling of 
shea.
49  
Remedying Risk and Information Asymmetry: Potential Lessons to Learn 
  
The “Market for Lemons” scenario is an applied case of the adverse selection 
problem. Pricing and coordination inefficiencies caused by information asymmetries and 
the resulting adverse selection are not unique to the Malian shea subsector. The 
analogies present stories of how adverse selection and moral hazard can be addressed 
to “modify or contain self-interested acts so that some balance is achieved in the 
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cooperative and competitive motivations of the participating parties” (Jaffee and Morton, 
1995).  
The use of analogies in subsector studies is a type of comparative institutional 
analysis and involves making generalizations from “one sub-sector from an in-depth 
appraisal to another” (French, 1974) and was originally proposed by Hildreth, Krause, 
and Nelson (1973). The objective is to identify potential lessons that can be learned and 
applied to the case of Malian shea—with the hopes of realigning incentives to improve 
the overall quality (thereby improving this country’s reputation on the world market) so 
that the sale of this commodity for export as high-valued and value-added commodity 
can fulfill its promise as a powerful rural income-generation and poverty-alleviation tool. 
The following sections highlight how incentives were realigned in other subsectors, 
resulting in improved pricing and market performance outcomes: shea in Burkina Faso 
and Ghana, argan in Morocco, coffee in Cameroon, fresh fruit in California at the turn of 
the 20
th century, and cotton in Mali. Each section closes with a discussion of specific 
lessons to learn and apply to case of shea in Mali.  
These five disparate analogies point to a variety of mechanisms to improve 
market performance outcomes by reducing information asymmetries, aligning incentives 
between contracting parties, and improving quality in a variety of agricultural subsectors 
plagued by the forces of moral hazard and adverse selection. These mechanisms 
include: direct, preferred-supplier relationships between producer groups and 
downstream actors; first-handling of agricultural products by primary producers 
themselves (a form of vertical integration); the creation of a verifiable system of grades 
and standards bolstered by government and industry support; contingent pricing   58
arrangements between producer groups and downstream intermediaries; and reforming 
institutional arrangements (such as reduction of government marketing board 
involvement in grading, pricing, marketing, and remuneration practices) to help ensure 
that producers do indeed “feel” the effects of differential payment for quality. In addition, 
these case studies reinforce the importance of producer group (cooperatives, 
associations, and unions) organization and the nature of subsector development 
assistance (i.e., the type of aid) in projects which attempt to increase returns to primary 
producers while simultaneously improving quality at either the primary handling or 
value-adding stages of production.  
A. Burkina Faso: The Role of Coordinated Government, Donor, and Private-Sector 
Efforts for Successful Subsector Promotion and Development  
 
  A spotlight currently shines on Burkina Faso, Mali’s eastern neighbor, where 
shea production and marketing is considered a West African success story. Over half of 
Burkinabé women are thought to participate in the production and marketing of shea 
(Gender and Trade, 2007). Although the estimated production potential in Burkina Faso 
is much lower than in Mali (150,000 MT of shelled shea nuts per year versus Mali’s 
250,000 MT per year), it is the quality of Burkinabé products, achieved via widespread 
information dissemination and complementary price premiums, that make this case 
worth studying.  Anecdotes from primary producer groups in the southern region of Mali 
(near Sikasso) and large traders and exporters confirm that Burkinabé traders 
systematically pay a higher price for shea than Malian traders, despite the lack of 
village-level quality testing mechanism (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007; Personal   59
communication with Peace Corps volunteers, 2007).
50 Presumably, this is thanks to 
Burkina Faso’s reputation within the subregion as a producer of high-quality shea 
products. The objective of this anecdote is to illustrate how concerted value chain 
support from government, donor, and the private-sector can facilitate the improvement 
of product quality, leading to a regional price advantage based on reputation and 
eventually the establishment of preferred-supplier relationships between larger primary 
producer groups and foreign oilseed and cosmetic firms.  
Shea’s important role in the Burkina Faso’s export earnings sparked government 
interest long ago—shea was ranked second only to cotton in terms of export earnings in 
the 1970s and 1980s and third behind cotton and gold more recently (Elias, 2003; 
Harsch, 2001). Historically, shea prices and exports were regulated via the price 
stabilization and export promotion board, “the Caisse de Stabilization des Prix et des 
Produits Agricoles” (CSPPA). During the 1990s, several key subsectors in Burkina Faso 
(including shea) underwent structural adjustment in response to donor and international 
organization suggestions. The CSPPA was dismantled as part of the country’s structural 
adjustment policies (SAPs). And, in 1994, the CFA franc was devalued by 50 percent 
(Elias, 2003). 
During this period, the government continued to stress importance of the shea 
sector to the national economy and especially to rural women’s livelihoods. In 1995 it 
made a public commitment to promote the status of women through the development of 
                                                 
50 Malian wholesalers suspect that porous borders between these two countries compounded by the Burkinabé “price premium” 
has led to extensive amounts of Malian shea being marketed internationally as “Burkinabé shea” (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007). This 
could be considered a negative performance outcome, as southern Malian producers may receive the Burkinabé premium, while the 
country as a whole suffers from declining declared export volumes and a declining regional reputation both detrimental to the 
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the shea sector. In 1995 the Projet National Karité (PNK) was established under the 
Ministère de la Promotion de la Femme through the Secértariat Permanent des 
Engagements Nationaux, a presidential task force to mitigate the challenges and take 
advantages of opportunities resulting from the devaluation of the CFA (Harsch, 2001; 
The Shea Network, 2007). 
51 
As the country’s economic situation worsened, donor and government efforts in 
the shea subsector began to mushroom under the guise of private-sector and gender-
and-development focused efforts. Eventually, because of the proliferation of shea 
projects, the government decided to take on the role of channel captain by establishing 
a “coordinating committee to ensure that the different donor institutions did not operate 
at cross-purposes or duplicate efforts” (Harsch, 2001). This committee initially benefited 
from a high public profile, and continues to do so today. Ms. Gisèle Guigma, the former 
minister of women’s advancement, played a vital role in attracting the United Nations 
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) to provide financial and technical assistance 
in the subsector.  
UNIFEM’s substantial contribution, complemented by extensive government 
oversight and support, was a turning point for over one hundred producer groups in 
Burkina Faso, as they received training in improved handling methods and oil extraction 
processes.
52 Collaborative efforts between government, donors, industry, and the 
producer groups themselves were instrumental in establishing direct, preferred-supplier 
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consumers.  
52 Discussions with international development organizations based in Mali suggest that this contribution was close to five million US 
dollars (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007).    61
relationships between producer groups and the French cosmetics firm Occitane (UNDP, 
2004).  
Preferred-supplier relationships are long-term contractual arrangements between 
subsequent actors in the marketing chain. Examples of this include the relationships 
large retailers such as Carrefour (France) and Wal-Mart (USA) establish with “dedicated 
and specialized wholesalers” (Reardon, AEC 861, 2005). Although the emergence of 
this phenomenon is often thought of in the context of current retail-led transformation of 
global agrifood systems (Reardon, AEC 861, 2005), some cosmetic and oilseed 
processing firms have established similar relationships with shea butter producer 
groups in some West African countries. Firms engaged in such arrangements include 
Aarhus United and Occitane in Burkina Faso and the Body Shop in Ghana.  
Such arrangements are designed to reduce search and transaction costs and 
ensure consistent and high-quality products. First, such long-term relationships help to 
assure market outlets for primary producers. Second, engaging marketing actors in 
repeated games helps to reduce incentives to cheat, or shirk on quality, thereby 
reducing information asymmetry. Moral hazard and adverse selection effects are 
reduced because those engaged in such relationships (buyers and suppliers) are aware 
that it is more beneficial to uphold the relationship than to renege on the agreement. 
Third, these arrangements increase returns to primary producers via the reduction of 
transaction costs, thereby permitting a reduction in the number of traders and 
middlemen.  
More recently, Aarhus United partnered with the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) to install 400 multifunctional platforms (UNDP, 2004), with the   62
objective of directly linking producers with their target markets.
53 Producer groups 
learned improved production and handling methods and were linked up with a market 
that was willing to pay for quality based on reputation.
54 Evidence suggests that the 
positive welfare implications of such arrangements are most important for organized 
urban producers and processors (Elias, 2003), as they have restricted access to 
necessary capital and market information and have been able to produce the necessary 
“Quality@ Quantity” (Lovett, 2004).
55 This issue is discussed in more detail in the Argan 
analogy.  
Overall, the positive effects of concerted donor, government, and private sector 
activities on the subsector include: (1) improved subsector organization, with 
government acting as a channel captain and targeted donor support; (2) the 
politicization of shea to ensure that it is continued to be viewed as an important 
resource for the national economy (for example, there is a designated Journée de la 
Karité (Shea Day) every year); (3) the establishment of direct producer relationships 
with foreign oilseed-processing companies; and (4) improving the quality and reputation 
of Burkinabé shea via widespread information dissemination on improved handling 
methods and linking farmers directly to markets to achieve the incentive effects and 
pricing efficiency. The direct effects of increased individual income and positive spillover 
effects resulting from increased incomes at the community level have resulted in 
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54 The reputation being that Occitane was knowledgeable and involved with the training process, which served as an informal 
“quality-assurance” seal.  
55 These groups are able to access important information and capital necessary for the successful international commercialization 
of shea and may not be engaged in the same time-competing activities as rural women (Elias et al., 2006).    63
improved livelihoods of many shea producers, their families, and surrounding 
communities.  
B.  Argan in Morocco: Putting into question who “wins” when high-valued agricultural 
commodities are promoted for foreign commercialization 
 
  This analogy tells the story of how the promotion of high-valued and value-added 
commodities historically dominated by the rural poor (such as shea) does not 
necessarily have positive welfare effects on primary rural producers (such as Malian 
women).
56 Although argan production has historically been dominated by the rural poor, 
urban entrepreneurs are primarily the actors to benefit from the global argan boom. It 
could be argued that this is primarily because the rural poor have not been able to 
address important quality issues due to lack of information and restricted access to 
capital—vital to the actual process of adding value. This has important implications for 
future efforts to develop the Malian shea subsector if measures of subsector 
performance outcomes include rural poverty alleviation.  
The argan tree, Argania spinosa (L.) is a threatened species, endemic to 
southwest Morocco. The trees are found in an area of around 830,000 hectares of an 
arid area affected by intense human pressure (Pumareda et al., 2006). Argan oil has 
been used historically in Morocco for many of the same purposes as shea (culinary, 
cosmetic, and medicinal) (Lybbert et al., 2002; Larocca, 2007). The primary handling 
and processing of argan seeds into oil is conducted entirely by women while men 
historically market the products. 
Argan has attracted increased international interest for three primary reasons. 
First is the role of Argan trees in slowing the process of desertification in southern 
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Morocco (Charrouf, 2002 and Lybbert et al., 2002). Second, given the importance of 
argan oil to local economies, it has been targeted as an income-generating tool as a 
non-traditional and value-added non-timber forestry product. Third, argan oil (extracted 
from the trees’ nuts) is one of the latest “miracle” ingredients in the Western beauty 
industry (Larocca, 2007) thanks to its restorative and age-defying effects. International 
development agencies and the Moroccan government have promoted the use of 
market-based incentives for the rural poor to protect and conserve the argan trees to 
help combat the forces of desertification. The rationale for this is essentially that the 
increasing value of argan oil will lead to an increase in the value placed on trees. This, 
in theory, should lead to a reduction in the felling of argan trees, thereby (1) decreasing 
the effects of desertification and (2) potentially improving the economic wellbeing of 
argan oil producers.  
Argan and shea exhibit other similar characteristics including the importance of 
both argan to the rural economy and primary handling practices on argan oil quality. 
Estimates suggest that prior to the discovery of this “liquid gold” (Larocca, 2007) by the 
West,  three  million people in argan-producing areas derived up to 90 percent of their 
income from the marketing of argan oil (Charrouf, 2002; Lybbert et al., 2002).   
Historically, only a small fraction of total oil production was marketed, with the majority 
consumed at the household level. Primary handling (depulping) and processing 
methods play a major role in argan oil quality (Lybbert et al., 2002). Most argan has 
historically been marketed via spot markets, where quality is not verifiable and prices 
are uniform–mirroring the “Market for Lemons” scenario present in the shea subsector.   65
Some argan is marketed via social networks, where reputation in repeated encounters 
helps marketing agents to command a price premium. 
As in the shea subsector, foreign consumers value high-quality (mechanically 
extracted, pure, undiluted) argan. Only a handful of entrepreneurs (wealthy urban 
entrants) in Morocco are able to meet such demands and receive a premium for quality. 
To date, traditional argan oil producers continue to access only the lowest price 
because they cannot access the “capital investments necessary to improve argan oil 
quality and reap associated market premia” (Lybbert et al., 2002) and face high “mobility 
barriers” (Fafchamps, 1994; Barrett, 1997). 
The difference between argan and shea is that there exist national-level quality 
standards for argan oil. And, although argan was originally identified by UNESCO and 
the Moroccan government as an important natural resource to be conserved (via 
market-based incentives) by the rural poor, those actually benefiting from the argan 
“boom” are not the rural poor, but rather new entrants into the subsector with the capital 
to (1) mechanically extract the oil in a manner that conforms with international standards 
and (2) test that their oil is in accordance with such standards. 
Women’s cooperatives occasionally capitalize on this emerging high-valued 
market by collectively raising funds to make necessary investments. Again, this mirrors 
a phenomenon observed in Mali where some of the larger cooperatives have acquired a 
mill or a multifunctional platform to help them deal with some of the issues related to 
village-level processing.  
The point to take from the argan story is that just because the “newly discovered” 
high-valued product for export is originally produced, consumed, and marketed by the   66
rural poor, they may not benefit from extensive international commercialization. This is 
especially the case when (1) the product is already produced and consumed extensively 
locally, resulting in competing marketing channels (as producers are also consumers of 
the good and affected in various ways by increased prices) or  (2) when quality is a 
major determinant of potential returns to producers, but can only be achieved through 
major capital investments. In the latter situation, quality and capital requirements can 
act as barriers to entry, thereby precluding small rural producers from penetrating 
international markets. In Morocco, rural transfer costs are so high that the rural poor in 
high forest density regions do not financially benefit from international argan oil 
commercialization in a way that could induce rural argan tree conservation (Lybbert et 
al., 2002). In low forest density areas, the response to increases in argan fruit prices 
(those paid by traders and processors) is increasingly aggressive argan fruit picking 
practices (Lybbert et al., 2002). Aggressive fruit picking may have two effects: first, 
using sticks or clubs to hit hard-to-reach fruit may cause damage to the trees, and 
second, excessive harvesting may not leave enough seeds for the trees to reproduce 
naturally. Together, these results thwart market-based conservation efforts for argan 
trees. 
This analogy highlights that the type of assistance and international intervention 
matters in ensuring that targeted populations (such as poor rural women) benefit from 
the international commercialization of indigenous products. Producer organization, 
access to capital, access to markets, infrastructure, market information, and quality-
verification methods all play into how well a processor (individual entrepreneur or 
cooperative) is able to directly supply to the international market and circumvent the   67
forces of moral hazard and adverse selection present at village-level markets. This 
analogy likewise underscores the role of the divergent incentives felt by poor rural 
producers, rural cooperatives, and individual entrepreneurs to improve quality. Evidence 
from this case suggests under the Argan subsector’s current structure, private 
incentives felt by individual entrepreneurs to invest in quality are strongest and 
economic incentives are not communicated to responsible parties to protect and 
conserve Argan trees.  Current market-based incentives have thwarted conservation 
and poverty alleviation efforts.  In the future, it may be possible to organize producer 
groups involved in primary handling and value-added activities such that necessary 
economic incentives are communicated through the value chain to induce investment in 
quality and tree conservation. 
C. Coffee in Cameroon: Institutional change and village-level quality improvement 
 
The objective of this analogy is to use the case of the Cameroonian Arabica 
coffee subsector to describe the role of institutional reform in reducing the effects of 
moral hazard and adverse selection, resulting in increased payment to primary handlers 
and improved product. Economic crises in Cameroon in the late 1980s led the World 
Bank (WB) to suggest economic reform via a series of structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs). An important component of the SAPs was the privatization of the Arabica coffee 
market, including national and cooperative-level policy-reform components. This section 
first describes some of the key structural characteristics of the Cameroonian Arabica 
coffee subsector and how these affect subsector conduct and performance; second is a 
discussion of key institutional arrangements during the pre-reform period and; third is a 
discussion of how improved Arabica coffee quality and pricing efficiency were achieved   68
during the post-reform period. This section concludes with a discussion of specific 
lessons that can be learned and applied to the Malian shea case. 
Coffee is truly a “for export” commodity in Cameroon in that it is rarely consumed 
domestically, with 95 percent of production destined for the international market. The 
Cameroonian Arabica coffee subsector is therefore composed of a single marketing 
channel. Coffee quality is largely dependent upon the practices undertaken by individual 
primary handlers, while quality is only measured with accuracy at (or towards) the end 
of the marketing chain—via taste-testing (cupping), undertaken in high-income coffee 
importing countries. In the coffee subsector, primary handling includes the harvesting 
and washing of coffee beans, which must begin within 24 to 36 hours of harvest.
57 
Unlike in many coffee-producing countries, coffee washing in Cameroon is performed 
by a large number of small and dispersed producers as an on-farm activity. These 
producers have been characterized as having high opportunity costs and important 
incentives to shirk (Wessen, 1998). Arabica coffee beans exhibit high levels of quality 
variation based on heterogeneous primary handling methods, including coffee bean 
washing, pulping, parchment fermentation, and drying—each of which influences of the 
quality of the final product. Local heterogeneity is compounded as economies of scale 
exist in coffee transportation, shipping (domestic and international), processing, and 
marketing—leading to progressive pooling at various stages of the marketing chain.  
During the pre-SAP period, the National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB) held 
the sole right to export Arabica coffee, retain the residual earnings from sales, and 
disburse earnings ad libitum. The NPMB administratively determined producer prices 
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and marketing margins for Arabica coffee and used pan-territorial pricing schemes, 
which contained minimal quality distinctions (washed versus unwashed and good 
versus bad quality beans). The NPMB also determined “residual bonus payments” to 
producers, which essentially institutionalized second payments to farmers in a way that 
had little if anything to do with performance (Wessen, 1998). Finally, the marketing 
board had exclusive control over the activities of coffee cooperatives—which linked 
primary producers and downstream marketing actors. Although unions were responsible 
for secondary processing (including milling, grading, and sorting), NPMB policies were 
such that the unions had little incentive to consistently sort or grade Arabica coffee 
destined for the export market. As a result, Cameroonian Arabic coffee quality 
deteriorated significantly under this regime, as did the prices paid by buyers, which were 
routinely discounted because of poor and inconsistent quality and unreliable shipments 
(World Bank, 1989 and USAID, 1990).  
The pre-SAP Cameroonian Arabica coffee subsector was characterized as 
exhibiting high levels of information asymmetry and few incentives for primary 
producers and intermediary actors to invest time into the production of high-quality 
beans—resulting in the forces of  moral hazard and adverse selection. First, progressive 
pooling makes it difficult for market feedback mechanisms (prices) to be felt by 
individual producer. Rather, the “group” was rewarded (or discounted) for quality based 
on a measurement of average quality of the entire lot. Second, Arabica coffee 
production involves a large number of processing stages and intermediaries, and long 
distances  between primary producers and final consumers, and it is difficult to 
determine quality at the producer level. Together, these resulted in weak market   70
feedback mechanisms (felt via prices) for the rural poor engaged in Arabica coffee 
production and marketing—those who are best poised to ensure quality and to 
potentially benefit on a wide scale from increased pricing efficiency.   
Economic crisis in Cameroon in the late 1980s led the WB and others to suggest 
a series of SAPs.  One of the main components was an agreement to liberalize the 
Arabica coffee market—a process that included national and cooperative-level policy 
reforms. While some reforms were achieved, much can be learned from the reforms 
that  were not made. For example, “early during implementation, reform planners 
realized that it was only feasible to track coffee from unions to the market” (Wessen, 
1998). A more extensive system of traceability could lead to losses in economies of 
scale in subsequent processing. This means that for individual producers to feel the 
benefits of improved quality the quality of the entire union-level pool would need to be 
improved. Primary producers were never established as residual claimants, and as such 
never fully felt the intended economic incentives of the reform process. This is despite 
introduced improved farm level quality-control measures (based on crude quality 
measures).  
Newly established marketing actors such as the North West Cooperative 
Association Ltd. (NWCA) only distinguished between “good” and “poor” quality coffee 
and never between mediocre and good, or good and best (Wessen, 1998). Producers 
were rewarded for average quality coffee. Another quality and pricing category reflecting 
economically important attributes could have reduced the production of “average” 
quality coffee and increased incentives to produce “high” quality Arabica coffee.    71
Despite all the problems, primary producers’ share of the export price increased 
to 70 percent (up from 50 percent during the 1980s) following market liberalization. 
Reduced prices for unwashed Arabica led to a decrease in the share of unwashed 
Arabica in total production. Producers responded to improved incentives by significantly 
expanding production as well. The market reforms also reduced the flow of Arabica 
coffee across provincial borders, where it could be classified as a different commodity 
and remunerated as such (producers were now remunerated for quality within their 
province and did not need to travel across provincial or national borders in order to 
receive differential payment for quality) (Wessen, 1998). Improved vertical coordination 
of cooperative marketing activities led to improved monitoring, resulting in a positive 
impact on quality.  
Several lessons can be drawn from this analogy. Most importantly, it highlights 
the potential importance of institutional change in improving producer incentives and 
product quality. Under the pre-SAP regime, individual producers and producer 
cooperatives were not rewarded for quality, as this happened further down the 
marketing chain (at the Union level, where the quality levels were decided, but not 
determined). The phenomenon in turn created space for adverse selection and moral 
hazard effects, as the subsector’s structure is such that high levels of information 
asymmetry at the “quality-determining” stages of production exist. The final result was 
that Cameroonian Arabica coffee was systematically discounted on the international 
market and the coffee even leaked over porous international borders to places where it 
could be re-labeled and command a slight premium thanks to the reputation of 
Cameroon’s neighbors (a sub-optimal performance outcome).    72
The removal of government from various marketing responsibilities allowed some 
incentives to trickle down to producers themselves, essential to improving Arabica 
coffee quality.  This is not to say the government’s role in subsector’s development is 
unimportant. Government can play a supporting role by (1) promoting the subsector as 
being of strategic importance to the national economy or to achieving important national 
objectives, such as increasing women’s incomes, (2) supporting a system of grades and 
standards, (3) attracting FDI or donor assistance, (4) conducting research or providing 
agricultural extension services, and (5) coordinating subsector development assistance.  
In addition, this analogy has highlighted the importance of vertical coordination in 
distinguishing, certifying, and rewarding for quality in the presence of various market 
failures. This is important as organizations such as the UEOMA begin to implement their 
regional grades and standards. This case also presents the importance of establishing 
not just “good” and “bad” qualities, but a sufficient number of grades to reflect the 
differences in quality valued by consumer. Finally, this case study has put a spotlight on 
the potential failures of pan-territorial pricing as production and marketing costs (such 
as transfer costs) vary widely across producers.   
D. California Fresh Fruit: Contingent pricing for transactions involving high levels of 
producer and buyer risk and uncertainty 
 
  The objective of this analogy is to present how contingent pricing (or two-part 
pricing) has been used in the California fresh-fruit subsector to address the issues of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Contingent pricing can lead to decreased producer 
price risk and improved quality in culturally dependent characteristics.
58 First is a 
description of the subsector’s structure. Second, is a discussion of information 
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asymmetry issues present and their role as sources of risk in this subsector. Third is a 
discussion of how contingent-pricing has been used at the cooperative level to help 
reduce price risk. Fourth is a presentation of potential lessons to learn from this 
analogy.  
Fresh fruits are high-valued, perishable, and often transported over long 
distances to reach final consumers. Fresh-fruit quality can be difficult to measure and 
can easily change between the point of sale and the final consumer. Quality also 
depends on both cultural and biological factors. Together these characteristics can lead 
to high levels of information asymmetry and risk felt by primary fresh-fruit producers and 
marketing agents.  
In the United States, California emerged as an important source of fresh produce 
in the early 20
th century, with important market outlets in the local canning industry, the 
East Coast (USA), and the international market (Garoyan, 1976). This structure led to 
high levels of risk for various actors in the marketing chain. First, rapid perishability can 
lead to high levels of risk in long-distance and international trade, as suppliers are 
vulnerable to customs and inspection delays, or false quality claims leading to inefficient 
pricing schemes (Jaffee and Morton, 1995). Second, the monopsonistic nature of the 
local fresh fruit processing sector made producers vulnerable to the detrimental effects 
of “hold-up” situations.
59 These and other downstream coordination problems eventually 
led primary fresh fruit producers to organize themselves into producer cooperatives.  
Fresh fruits and vegetables are pooled  at either the cooperative level or first 
handler level (Staatz, 1987). This serves two primary purposes. First, this is one way to 
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handle some of risk caused by potentially volatile production levels and prices. Second, 
there are economies of scale via either private or collective action in post-harvest 
handling, processing, and in certain quality control and transport operations the through 
coordination of marketing activities (Jaffee and Morton, 1995).  As a result of pooling, 
producers lose incentives to produce anything other than the minimum acceptable level 
to be in the pool, often leading to the degradation of the pool’s overall quality. The 
resulting scenario often leads to buyers paying either the price of the average quality or, 
in a worst case scenario, the price of the lowest quality—Akerlof’s “Market for Lemons.”  
Although quality is important for all fresh fruit market outlets, determining, 
measuring, and ensuring quality can create obstacles for producers and marketing 
actors. For example, fresh-fruit quality is determined by biological (i.e., the variety of 
tree, quality of soil, rainfall) and cultural practices (referring to how the products are 
handled and processed during the harvesting and post-harvest process). While the 
cultural determinants of quality described above are certainly under the control of 
producers, biological determinants are not necessarily. As a result, producers are 
reluctant to receive payment strictly as a function of quality, as it is not entirely under the 
producer’s control. Typically, the producer has to receive an additional premium to 
make it worth the risk. At this point, the question is whether at this new price the final 
product can still be competitive in the market (Staatz, Personal Communication, 2007). 
In addition, it can be difficult to measure and assess quality (Hueth, 1999), as some 
attributes may be hidden or difficult to measure (Jaffee and Morton, 1995), leading to 
moral hazard problems on the part of primary producers (Hueth, 1999). This also 
implies that reputation is central to the fresh marketing and trade, as it “serves as close   75
proxy for (expected) quality and overall reliability” (Jaffee and Morton, 1995).  Inefficient 
pricing outcomes resulted from these various sources of uncertainty and risk, much like 
the Malian shea subsector.  
One of the first mechanisms through which producers decided to solve some of 
these risk-related problems was via cooperative organization. This was first and 
foremost designed to address problems related to (1) input availability and (2) 
downstream marketing practices. For example, the California Fruit Growers Exchange 
(later Sunkist) vertically integrated backward and forward to gain greater control over 
the input and distribution systems for their products (Olmstead and Rhode, 1997; 
Staatz, 1987). A second mechanism was the establishment of cooperative-level 
contingent pricing mechanisms.  
During the early 20
th century, parallel to cooperative organization and vertical 
integration, fresh-fruit producers agreed to contingent pricing arrangements to help 
resolve pricing inefficiencies (Olmstead and Rhodes, 1997). Contingent pricing 
contracts at the cooperative level have several advantages in an uncertain environment 
(Staatz, 1987). According to Wessen (1998) “contingent pricing, or two-payment, 
arrangements are the most common solution to this pricing dilemma. During the initial 
market transaction, a pricing formula or convention is used to make a partial payment to 
farmers. A second payment, or bonus, is paid after quality is measured and sales prices 
are determined. The second payment communicates any quality premium (or discount) 
back to the individual producer, and thus rewards him for quality.” The important result 
is that primary producers and handlers were rewarded for investing their time and 
energy into the quality attributes which they had control over even though many of these   76
are expressed at a later time downstream in the marketing chain. Together, cooperative 
organization and contingent pricing arrangements helped to address residual claimancy 
issues on the part of producers in that they were made directly responsible (in terms of 
how they are compensated by downstream marketing agents) for the poor (or good) 
expression of important quality attributes (Hueth et al., 1999). 
Contingent pricing arrangements in the Malian shea subsector will require high 
levels of transparency and trust in the system developed to make payments to 
producers. Although incentives to shirk abound, the cooperative is likely the best 
positioned to administer contingent pricing schemes. High levels of information 
asymmetry and a lack of trust make it impossible to develop contingent pricing contracts 
between individual primary producers and village-level traders. This is in part because 
individual producers engaging with traders may be suspicious about whether the final 
reported price was indeed the price received (Staatz, Personal Communication, 2007). 
These same producers may likewise be suspicious about quality deterioration due to 
mishandling between the village and the final market. Producers may accept contingent 
pricing at the cooperative level than via individual spot-market transactions, as the 
cooperative is more likely to be vigilant of protecting members’ interests.
60  
First, contingent payment could be made part of the cooperative organization and  
agreement (mandate). Second, producer and downstream market actor organization 
coordination needs to address free-rider issues present in the pooling process. For 
example, pooling “good” and “bad” quality products inhibits payment for quality (for the 
cooperative’s pooled nuts or butter) downstream, which in turn reduces the premium for 
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quality to be paid to primary producers as part of the second stage of the two-stage 
contingent pricing arrangement. Producer organizations such as the cooperative may 
be best positioned help to encourage peer monitoring to help reduce incentives to cheat 
throughout the pooling process.   
E. Cotton, Mali: First Handling by Primary Producers  
 
The objective of this analogy is to present how first-handling by primary cotton 
producer associations has helped to overcome some of the distrust between producers 
and graders in the Malian cotton subsector. This distrust is rooted in high levels of 
information asymmetry on the parts of both producers and graders, resulting in moral 
hazard and adverse selection. First is a description of some of the important structural 
characteristics of the Malian cotton subsector. Second is a presentation of the types of 
information asymmetry present and resulting effects. Third is a description of how the 
negative effects of information asymmetry have been addressed and how pricing 
efficiency, quality, and returns to producers can improve.    
  Mali is one of West Africa’s most important cotton producers, second only to 
Burkina Faso (Esteulle et al., 2007). Ninety-eight percent of Malian cotton is exported by 
the dually monoponistic and monopolistic “Compagnie Malienne pour le de 
Développement des Fibres Textiles” (CMDT), resulting in no competing production or 
marketing channels. Cotton is Mali’s second most important export after gold, 
contributing to eight percent of gross domestic product (Behrendt, 2006; Tefft, 2003; 
Tefft, 2004).  It is therefore of strategic importance to the national economy.   
Cotton is generally produced by small-scale producers  (two to three hectares) 
(Behrendt, 2006), undergoes primary grading and sorting at the village association   78
level, and is marketed to a monopsonistic buyer, the CMDT, under a fixed, pan-
territorial pricing scheme established at the beginning of the cotton season (Tefft, 2003; 
Tefft, 2004). Producing cotton under smallholder conditions mentioned above often 
requires a trade-off between quality and quantity (May, 2003), as pricing incentives 
present are such that producers would often prefer to sell large quantities of mediocre-
quality cotton in lieu of small quantities of high-quality cotton. Cotton is pooled at various 
stages of the marketing chain (association level, via the transportation process, and at 
the ginning facility), leading to reduced individual incentives to invest in quality. 
The quality of cotton is determined by its spinning quality and is measured by 
four sets of fiber characteristics: fiber length and length uniformity; strength; fineness 
and maturity; and percentage of broken fibers (Bingen, 2006). These quality 
characteristics may be compromised by a combination of biological and cultural factors 
(Bingen, 2006).  Quality standards are established by the CMDT at least once a year at 
the beginning of the cotton production season (Bingen, 2006). Many village-level 
associations use sample boxes of cotton distributed by the CMDT (which uses the 
USDA’s grades) in an effort improve visual association-level grading. 
A major issue in this subsector is the lack of trust between primary producer 
groups and those involved in the formal grading process, which takes place 
downstream in the marketing chain at the point of ginning (Bingen et al., 1995; Tefft, 
2003; Tefft, 2004). This has resulted in moral hazard and adverse selection effects in 
the production and marketing of various qualities of cotton.  For example, at the time of 
transaction, producers know their investment toward the production a certain quality of 
cotton (adverse selection). After an agreement or contract has been established,   79
producers, traders and ginners control various cultural factors playing into cotton quality 
(moral hazard). The resulting scenario, compounded by the negative effects of pooling, 
is one in which overall quality and price is driven down.  
In 1974, the CMDT established Associations Villageoises (AV)—village-based 
farmer organizations—to address farmer complaints of “dishonest cotton grading and 
weighing practices” (Bingen et al., 1995; Tefft, 2003; Tefft, 2004). This eventually led to 
the processes of seed cotton assembly, weighing, grading, and ginning receiving 
oversight and participation from local cotton farmer organizations (Bingen, 1998). At that 
time, the CMDT understood the importance of farmer incentives on the successful 
development of Mali’s cotton subsector. These incentives included, but were not limited 
to, access to credit to purchase inputs and equipment, a guaranteed market to sell their 
seed cotton at fixed prices (Tefft, 2003), and differential payment for quality. Vertical 
structure and involvement by the CMDT in the subsector has resulted in very few (if 
any) intermediaries between primary producers and the CMDT. This “vertically 
integrated support” (Tefft, 2004) to the cotton subsector in the form of production inputs, 
credit, research, extension support has allowed the CMDT to monitor and influence 
cotton production carefully, despite the somewhat atomistic nature of primary 
producers.  
Several important lessons can be learned from this analogy. The first handling of 
cotton by village-level producer groups in Mali has attempted to achieve two goals: first, 
it is a form of vertical integration (from the bottom up) which theoretically may lead to a 
reduction in transaction costs and, second, it addresses the historical asymmetrical   80
information issues present during the cotton grading and sorting processes.
61 With 
vertical integration and coordination and the subsequent reduction of some transaction 
costs, we may observe a greater percentage share of the final retail price going to 
primary producers. The extent depends on the additional costs associated with new 
subsector activities with which primary producers may be altogether unfamiliar. Primary 
producers’ engagement in grading and other activities helped to improve their 
understanding of quality issues present and their trust in marketing chain actors—with 
the potential to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection effects.    
While first handling arrangements may improve quality and returns to primary 
producers, this case revealed several complementary factors that must first be 
addressed before shea producers can become “first” or “primary” handlers in the sense 
described above including:  (1) the organization of producers into village-level producer 
groups or associations, (2) a distinct and reasonably verifiable set of quality 
characteristics for producers, traders and buyers alike to look for, (3) improved 
information flows between international oilseed and cosmetics companies and primary 
producers and handlers, and (4) an agreement by marketing chain actors. If any of 
these is missing, the potential to reduce information asymmetries and cheating falls 
significantly. 
First, producers should be organized at the village level (beyond the informal 
women’s associations) to designate what is produced and where goods are stored, in 
addition to who learns and implements grading and sorting methods proposed by 
Prokarité.  Evidence suggests that women’s associations and cooperatives play an 
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important, if not vital, role in the production of large quantities of high quality shea nuts 
(collection, drying, and primary pooling).  This is primarily because of the tendency of 
individuals to shirk (i.e., make time-saving shortcuts) in the absence of monitoring 
mechanisms, leading to the “Market for Lemons” scenario. With group, or collective, 
action this scenario might be avoided via the peer pressure and monitoring 
mechanisms, much like those used in group micro-credit lending (the Grameen Bank 
model, as an example).  
The author sees no reason why subsequent pooling and processing into butter is 
any better suited to cooperatives than to private firms.  In fact, private investors and 
entrepreneurs might be better positioned to purchase mechanized milling equipment 
and dried nuts for extraction (Elias et al., 2006).
62 These actors might have better 
access to credit, imported capital for shea oil extraction, and information about market 
outlets and improved processing methods. Through their individual investments, 
entrepreneurs might have better incentives to maintain their equipment and stay up to 
date on the latest technologies and trends outside of the realm of NGO and donor 
support (Hyman, 1991). As long as they are remunerated by downstream marketing 
actors, private entrepreneurs would also have an incentive to pay for quality for their 
inputs of production (the shea nuts).  
Second, information regarding grading and sorting specifications should be 
disseminated at the beginning and throughout the shea season. This helps to reinforce 
previously learned information and methods, and update producers about prices and 
other market information. Another advantage of the organization of shea nut handlers is 
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that information may be more readily accessible and more easily disseminated at the 
association level than to individuals. This is especially the case in rural settings, where 
such information is often disseminated via (1) radios (which may not be accessible to 
women) or (2) village-level markets (where women are truly price takers).  
Third, cotton grading is possible at the association level thanks to a clear set of 
grades and standards that are set by the CMDT at the end of each production season 
for the next growing year. This has resulted in improved information flow between the 
buyers and the primary producer associations. Although the regional project “ProKarité” 
has attempted to set up a similar set of uniform grades and standards for shea in West 
Africa (see section V), to date, individual companies are responsible for setting their 
own standards for shea, often only be verified by laboratory analysis.  
As discussed previously, many actors in the marketing chain should be consulted 
and implicated for this system of grades and standards to be credible and achieve its 
goals. As of August, 2007, the major Malian shea cooperatives and exporters were in 
the process of establishing parallel producer and exporter networks, with a universal 
goal of establishing an avenue through which to apply pressure on government to pay 
closer attention to shea. A network-based approach to addressing questions of grades, 
standards, quality, pricing, and certification will likely be most effective in the Malian 
shea case to help balance domestic interests against the strong and centralized 
international ones. Relying on the pre-established organizational strength of the 
networks may also help to facilitate the flow of information between actors.  
 Fourth, one issue plaguing the shea subsector in Mali is a lack of trust between 
various actors in the marketing chain (namely between primary producers and village-  83
level traders). This is largely due to high information costs associated with the grading 
and sorting of shea at the village level. Establishing shea producer organizations as first 
handlers requires the blessings of downstream marketing actors, including traders and 
exporters. While the objectives of the previously mentioned shea producer and exporter 
networks are not perfectly congruent, they may be able to work together to achieve 
mutually beneficial outcomes (i.e., increase quality shea sold, improve the reputation of 
Malian shea on the world market, and augment the price paid by international buyers).  
This may be most easily achieved by establishing deeper and more widespread direct 
links between larger cooperative groups and exporters to address some of the 
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VIII.   Past Interventions and Future Areas of Government, Donor, NGO and 
University-based Support: Prescriptions and Policy Recommendations and 
suggested areas of future investigation 
 
Government, donors, and non-governmental organizations have used the 
subsector studies approach to efficiently identify ways to improve market performance 
and develop agricultural subsector assistance strategies. The analogies above 
demonstrate that the location of information asymmetry in a subsector as well as the 
type of assistance provided play an important role in intervention outcomes—including 
improved product quality and how the poor benefit from the commercialization of their 
products to high-income foreign consumers.
63 As such, the identification of key leverage 
points within the value-chain is of high priority in that it (along with other results from the 
subsector analysis and analogies) helps to motivate both policy recommendations and 
future areas of investigation. The following discussion follows that logic: first is a 
presentation of both past and current interventions by government and donors, second 
is a presentation of the key leverage points identified through the subsector analysis, 
third are policy recommendations to government followed by recommendations to 
donors and NGOs, and finally is a brief presentation of potential extensions and future 
areas of investigation.  
Past Interventions in the Malian Shea Subsector 
Four factors motivate interest in promoting the Malian shea value chain: Mali’s 
important shea tree population, the growing niche-market demand in industrialized nations 
for shea butter, the large number of female participants in the subsector, and the relative 
importance of cash income from shea to many female participants. Interventions have 
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largely been under the guise of non-traditional agricultural export diversification efforts. 
These efforts have largely been project-based—designed to help producers in specific 
villages or zones (identified as having particularly high production potential) or in highly 
visible urban centers. This is the despite the presence of primary shea producers 
throughout the country. 
Interventions designed to improve shea quality and returns to primary producers 
have largely done so at either the primary producer or exporter level. These have 
generally focused on improved production technologies (including improved handling 
and processing techniques and labor-saving technologies), producer group organization 
and technical assistance to producer associations in the areas of marketing and 
contracting (including quality and packaging requirements), linking farmers to markets, 
exporter assistance, and environmental preservation and sustainability through agro-
forestry parkland preservation at the primary producer level. Aside from a few success 
stories (mentioned in previous sections), these past interventions have largely failed to 
provide the necessary incentives at the primary producer level to motivate rural women to 
produce shea with the quality characteristics desired by international buyers and required to 
improve the reputation of shea “made in Mali.” 
 Improved Production Technologies: Labor-Saving Capital and Handling Methods  
Traditional shea oil extraction methods are labor-intensive. In an effort to help lighten 
women’s workload, new labor-saving technologies including diesel-powered mills, oil-
extractors, and various shea nut dryers have been developed and introduced. Such 
projects were especially popular in the early 1980s (Hyman, 1991), but adoption rates were 
low. This was largely due to the difficulty of maintaining prototype machines in a setting   86
where spare parts were limited and where incentives for machinery upkeep were low 
(Hyman, 1991).  
More recently, multifunctional platforms have been the centerpiece of many efforts 
to reduce women’s time constraints and physical work burden.  As their name suggests, 
these were designed as part of a more comprehensive effort to reduce women’s labor 
burden (opportunity cost) and increase rural women’s income (some MFPs are used to 
produce electricity; others are used to mill grains). The UNDP (in concert with the Malian 
government) and the African Development Foundation have supported MFP installation 
efforts. The author’s observations suggest that prerequisites for receiving such assistance 
include high levels of producer organization, storage capacity, and shea nut quality (such 
as the Siby-based COPROKASI and the Zantiebougou-based CORPOKAZAN).  
Solar shea nut dryers have also been developed as labor-saving technologies. 
These include a solar-panel-powered dryer from the Institute d’Economie Rural (IER) 
and a ventilated, plastic-covered dryer developed by ProKarité (a regional project 
funded by the UN’s Common Fund for Commodities). Neither has been adopted due to 
(1) the capital requirements to install and maintain them; (2) their low capacity and, (3) 
although the solar dryers were created to help reduce shea nut drying time, users found 
that they actually lengthen the drying time (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007; Hyman, 
1991).
64 Some larger cooperatives are experimenting with table dryers that are very 
similar to the tables used in Ghana to dry cocoa. The frame is made of wood and local 
materials and the tabletop is made of natural water-permeable fibers to allow rainwater 
                                                 
64 For example, in Figure 5, the solar powered dryer was originally designed by IER to dry horticultural products such as tomatoes, 
onions and shallots. The cooperative in Lafiala found that it actually increased average drying time (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007).    87
to filter through without causing damage to the drying shea nuts (ULPK, Personal 
Communication, 2006).  
 
Figure 5   IER Solar powered shea nut dryer, Lafiala, Mali (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007) 
 
 
Figure 6    Prokarité Shea nut dryer, Zantiebougou, Mali (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007)  
 
There have been many efforts to promote the “boil and sundry” drying and improved 
processing methods. Producer groups in the areas surrounding Sikasso told stories of 
NGOs and donors providing technical training to improve shea product drying, processing, 
and storage, but not providing market outlets with a price premium for their value-added 
products (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007). After adopting the improved handling methods the first 
year, they quickly disadopted them—underscoring the importance of both disseminating 
improved technologies and ensuring market outlet in which producers can command a 
price-premium.    88
In 2007 and 2008, Prokarité, the West African Trade Hub (WATH), and USAID Mali 
collectively organized training sessions for producer groups recruited via American Peace 
Corps volunteers. Primary producers, traders, exporters, and donors alike were present 
and received identical training. These training sessions serve three particularly important 
purposes: (1) they make use of the highly mobile Peace Corps volunteers to play a linking 
role between primary producer and the international market; (2) they put producers and 
exporters face to face with one another, while historically they would be separated by a 
host of middlemen; and  (3) they serve as an informal quality-assurance seal, helping to 
reduce some of the information asymmetry between producers and buyers (Perakis 
Fieldwork, 2007). Although the actual results from these encounters are mixed, it is a 
potential organizational approach to help overcome the “Market for Lemons” situation.  
Producer Organization  
Given the importance of group work and pooling in shea production and marketing, 
several organizations provide assistance in the area of producer organizations and 
cooperative management. For example, in the late 1990s, OMAFES was responsible for 
organizing producer groups in the Koulikoro region. This effort targeted specific value 
chains aimed at augmenting agricultural diversification such as shea, sesame, and garden 
vegetable production.  During this same period, the NGO Association Conseil pour le 
Development (ACOD) provided similar assistance to the large Siby-based COPROKAZAN.   
The Dutch NGO SNV provided similar assistance to the producer Union ULPK, in Dioila, 
until 2007. In the latter case, efforts were well intentioned, but the incentives created 
through the cooperative mandate were counter-productive (above-market prices were paid 
for shea butter, regardless of quality; there was a lack of union-level quality control, and   89
pooling of products within and between member cooperatives), reflecting the importance of 
strong producer organization goals and objectives and the potential distorting effects of 
artificial donor incentives. 
Technical Assistance to Wholesalers and Exporters 
Mali’s reputation as a producer of low quality shea nuts and butter led international 
donors to provide train wholesalers and exporters in the area of improved shea handling 
and marketing, with the assumption that both this knowledge and incentives would trickle 
down to primary producers. Until 2005, USAID primarily targeted the large Bamako-based 
exporters with various types of exporter assistance programs, including training in the areas 
of quality and packaging requirements for export and contracting. These actors are more 
visible than village-level producers in that they have fixed addresses, websites, cell-phone 
numbers, and, most importantly, access to important information.  There is no doubt these 
actors have an incentive to procure the best quality products from their buyers, but in some 
ways they are caught between a rock in a hard place— they automatically receive a price 
discount for shea “made in Mali” and they rely on a network of traders who also have an 
incentive to behave opportunistically, thereby compromising the ability of benefits from such 
assistance to trickle down to the producer level.  
  Since 2004, the Malian government’s Ministry of Women’s Affairs (Ministère de la 
Promotion de la Femme, l’Enfant, et de la Famille, MPFEF) has supported several urban 
shea producer unions. These are geographically focused and capital-intensive projects 
located in urban centers of Kayes, Koulikoro, Ségou, Sikasso, and Mopti. The unions’ 
program has extensive and lofty goals (improved producer organization, quality, and   90
marketing) but is run exclusively through the MPFEF. The project is still in progress, due to 
conclude in 2009, and results remain to be seen.  
Environment preservation and sustainability  
   Concerns have developed over the health and sustainability of the agro-forestry 
parklands where shea trees are found. For example, some sources believe that the shea 
trees are aging (resulting in a loss of productivity) and seedlings are not given the chance to 
sprout or mature because of current parkland management practices. In response, the 
Canadian International Development organization, CECI, as well as Peace Corps Mali are 
working with producer groups to maintain agro-forestry parklands (CECI, 2008; Perakis, 
Fieldwork, 2008). Agricultural research institutions, including the Institut d’Economie Rural 
(IER), IPR/IFRA de Katibougou, and ICRAF currently conduct research focused on 
reducing the maturation rate of shea trees through breeding techniques (Perakis, 
Fieldwork, 2006 and 2007) and developing easily replicable shea tree grafting techniques.  
Key Leverage Points for Future Interventions 
The quality of Malian shea is determined by primary producer and processor 
practices, and producer practices are influenced by the monetary compensation received 
from downstream marketing actors (traders, wholesalers, exporters, etc.). This important 
feedback throughout the subsector underscores the highly interdependent nature of the 
“structure-conduct-performance” framework (Jesse, 1978).  A thorough understanding of 
potential responses at key leverage points is important to make policy recommendations 
within the value chain designed to promote improved quality and attain higher returns to 
primary producers. These leverage points are also critical points in the value-chain where 
information asymmetry or uncertainty exists, where actors (such as government) can play a   91
role in reducing information constraints or women’s opportunity cost, or improve the 
reputation of shea “made in Mali.”  
In the domestic Malian shea subsector, these leverage points may include the 
primary producer or cooperative level (where primary quality is determined); the 
trader/middleman level (where quality verification may initially occur); the exporter or 
wholesaler level (those with the capital to store and process large quantities of shea and to 
create preferred-supplier relationships); and government (agencies with the potential to 
provide subsector oversight and facilitate coordination efforts). As previously discussed, the 
ability of women to produce large volumes of high quality shea nuts and butter also 
depends on interventions in those parallel subsectors that constrain women’s time 
(complementary and competing markets). Regionally, trade-facilitating agreements and 
market information networks exist. It may be possible in the future to piggyback on these 
already established networks to facilitate trade flows in shea between countries. Drawing 
on the results from this subsector analysis, lessons from past interventions on the shea 
subsector, and the key leverage points identified above, the following section will discuss 
future areas of government, donor, and NGO support.  
Future Interventions: Some Policy Recommendations 
             All future interventions aimed at simultaneously increasing shea product quality and 
revenues to primary producers should take into account economic incentives necessary to 
achieve such goals. This entails either compensating for quality or adjusting women’s 
opportunity cost
65.  Several realities suggest that collaborative work between the Malian 
government, donors, NGOs, research institutions, and the private sector will be most 
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effective. First, efforts (both successful and unsuccessful) are often duplicated. Second, 
both pricing efficiency and improved quality rely on efforts by actors at various levels of the 
value chain (as well as in competing and complementary markets). Third, donor and local 
government funds for work such as value chain promotion have been reduced recently. 
These realities suggest that collaboration between subsector participants through 
arrangements like the “Task Force Approach” proposed by Harrison et al. (1974) will be 
essential for the successful implementation leveraged subsector interventions.   
Recommendations to Government: National Scale Coordination and Risk Bearing  
Drawing on evidence from the Burkinabé value-chain, Malian government may be  
best positioned to take on some of the risk associated with broad-based rural development 
efforts as well as coordinate, provide oversight, and endorse multiple value-chain activities 
with independent (but interrelated) goals— improved quality and reputation, returns to 
primary producers, and food security (reasonably priced vegetable oil for local 
consumption). In the subsector studies literature, this is referred to as the role of “channel 
captain.” Donors, NGOs, and the private sector have the potential support and bolster this 
effort through technical assistance.  
First, although there are many actors in the value chain (government, donors, 
NGOs, entrepreneurs, cooperatives, and individual women), the unique characteristics 
of the shea economy are such that private incentives are not strong enough for any 
individual (entrepreneur or trading group) to take on the role of “channel captain”. 
Second is the role of shea in rural household food security. Shea fruit is consumed during 
lean season before cereal crops are harvested, shea butter is used extensively as a 
cooking oil (fat), and sales from shea products provide important cash income to many   93
Malian women. There are therefore multiple channels of production and consumption 
(geared toward the domestic and international markets) with their own specific role in 
the rural economy. The Malian government would therefore be a channel captain for 
multiple channels of production and consumption. Third, although there are no data to 
formally confirm this, evidence suggests that shea does make an important contribution to 
Mali’s agricultural exports and gross domestic product (GDP).  Fourth, Mali’s reputation on 
the regional market is a public good. Fifth, the largest identified area of growth and 
future expansion is in cosmetics—with the highest and most stringent quality 
requirements. Efforts to establish and enforce grades and standards for this niche 
market will likely require active participation of government (and other subsector 
participants). Sixth is the direct and indirect role of complementary markets in shea 
production (water, fuel, transportation, and credit). Finally, the Malian government is 
already involved in the shea economy through the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
(MPFEF), the Rural Economics Institute (IER), the Agricultural University (IPR/IFRA), 
and the Agricultural Market Observatory (OMA). Together, these suggest the Malian 
government has an interest in developing the subsector and that it is best positioned to 
help take on the coordinating and risk-bearing role of channel captain. 
Given the complexity and multiple actors (and roles) of the shea economy, it is 
not appropriate to simply the charge the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MPFEF) with this 
task. Unfortunately, as noted by Buvunić and Mehra (1990), this type of arrangement is not 
uncommon in agriculturally focused women’s income-generation projects in developing 
country settings. Although the MPFEF is the government agency most concerned with 
women’s welfare, those providing advice and technical assistance through this ministry   94
likely do not have the level of expertise in agricultural marketing as the economists, 
extension agents, agronomists, and food scientists in the Ministry of Agriculture necessary 
to achieve the multiple goals and objectives outlined above.  
Harrison et al. (1974) suggested a task-force approach to address agricultural 
marketing obstacles in situations much like the one in question. This involves bringing 
together interested government organizations, industry players from all levels of the 
value-chain, donors, and agricultural research institutions (domestic and international). 
Given the increasingly complicated international market, several actors at several levels of 
the marketing chain are now required to truly link farmers to markets. This collaborative 
approach has been successful in Burkina Faso (for shea) and more recently in Zambia (for 
cassava).  In Burkina, government played the role of channel captain, while in Zambia, key 
industry leaders played important organizing and coordinating roles (Chitundu et al., 
2006).  
The second key role of a channel captain is as a risk-bearing entity. In the Malian 
setting, this would include investments in human and physical capital and information 
services directly and indirectly related in the shea economy. These efforts would likely 
be as part of more general agricultural sector development and rural conservation 
efforts and might touch on issues related to rural water, fuel wood, and credit 
availability, or extension programs designed from women.  
Recommendations to Donors and NGOs: Support and Technical Assistance 
Should government decide to take on the coordinating role outlined above, 
donors and NGOs will continue to provide important complementary services (local 
technical assistance) and support to the shea economy. First, they may help define and   95
support government activities. In this sense, the Malian government doubles as a key-
leverage point.  Donors and NGOs can provide support to the Malian government in the 
form of technical assistance and also contribute to or co-manage parts of their programs.   
These organizations may continue to help support regional experience-sharing efforts 
amongst actors (including government) of shea producing countries.  Finally, these 
actors may be well positioned to help initiate and support public-private partnerships to 
develop the subsector. 
An overarching observation is that cooperative organization and management 
frequently plays an important role in the incentives faced by primary producers in the 
creation and marketing high-quality goods. Therefore, a second key area where donors 
and NGOs may continue to play an important role is in producer group organization and 
management, including developing membership arrangements, grading and sorting, 
traceability, and marketing strategies and decisions.
66 This would be a continuation of many 
of the geographically focused efforts already in place. As we know, producers are very 
responsive to economic incentives. Therefore, donors and NGOs may encourage 
experience sharing and brainstorming within and between cooperatives and unions to 
determine how to align incentives at this level.  
Rural female shea producers are highly immobile and have repeatedly referred to 
uncertain market outlets as a limiting factor to producing high-quality shea products 
(Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007)—underscoring the importance of linking farmers to markets with 
                                                 
66 For example, the Zantiebougou cooperative established three grades of shea nuts (boiled and sun-dried, boiled and roasted, and buried 
and roasted), with the help of primary producers (members and non-members). Nuts were bagged and stored in the cooperative’s storage 
facility. Women were then employed by the cooperative (at a wage of 750 to 1000 CFA F (US $ 1.50 to $2.00) per day) to use the 
multifunctional platform and improved methods to extract shea oil.  This cooperative’s president noted that buying finished butter from 
producers was problematic because of high levels of information asymmetry.   96
information. Therefore, a third area where donors and NGOs may play an important role is 
by disseminating information related to both market information and improved technologies 
and handling methods. This would likely most easily be accomplished through producer 
organizations at the village level and could be in collaboration with those involved with 
efforts to develop labor-saving technologies (such as the Malian government, IER, and the 
regional program, ProKarité) and market information services (OMA). Individual primary 
producers and producer groups mentioned an interest in having an “emission karité” (shea 
radio show) play once a week for primary producers to receive information on prices, 
handling methods and storage, and potential market outlets (Perakis, Fieldwork, 2007). 
This would be a true leveraged intervention in that a relatively small activity (a radio show) 
could directly reach a very large number of people—anyone with access to radio.   
As discussed previously, exporters have been the targeted for much of the recent 
donor and NGO technical assistance in this subsector. These actors may also continue to 
benefit from the organization of a shea exporter (wholesaler) association for the purposes 
of (1) representing a unified position on agricultural and trade policy initiatives (as an 
interest group) and (2) experience sharing. For example, some exporters and wholesalers 
have established preferred-supplier relationships with rural cooperative groups. Others use 
their own quality-verification mechanisms, which may be transferable to the village level. 
The experiences of these entrepreneurs may provide insight into future leveraged 
interventions at the cooperative, wholesaler, or exporter levels. These private actors may 
also benefit from guidance and technical assistance from organization with experience with 
collaborative trader or exporter organization efforts (like CONESAM or ROESAO).      97
  Current environmental and sustainability concerns in Mali are likely as diverse as 
this country’s landscape.  However, one major area of concern has been regarding the 
mature age of the country’s shea trees and low regeneration rates. Therefore, a fifth 
area in which donors and NGOs may be well positioned to continue to provide support 
and technical assistance is in the area of agro-forestry parkland management and 
environmental sustainability. This would likely include training in natural resource 
management (tree-grafting and replanting) and would entail a joint effort between the 
producers who utilize this part of Mali’s natural landscape and research organizations 
already engaged in such activities.  
  Finally, donors and NGOs may continue to help support public research in the 
shea sub-sector. This may include facilitating collaborative efforts (including exchange 
programs) for on-going research within the sub-region to identify labor-saving 
technologies or village-level quality testing mechanisms.  This may also include 
financially supporting some of the identified extensions of this study and future research 
opportunities outlined below.  
Extensions and Future Research Opportunities  
The high opportunity cost of women’s time has been identified as an important 
limiting factor in the production of high-quality shea nuts and butter. It will therefore first be 
vital to have a better understanding of women’s time constraints in Mali’s diverse agro-
ecological zones and second develop tools or interventions to help lighten the burden of 
women’s work in order to provide women with the incentives to improve shea handling 
methods and quality in the long term. Collecting this information may be integrated into part 
of more general studies of rural women’s contribution to and benefits (income) from on-  98
farm and off-farm activities throughout the year. Cooperative organization efforts would also 
benefit from this information in that it could help explain producer organization dynamics 
and motivate alternative producer organization design. 
Another use of this information would be in studies designed to identify the actual 
cost associated with producing, for example, one kg of shea butter. With more detailed 
information on differences in women’s opportunity cost and costs of inputs of production 
(such as fuel wood and water), it may be possible to work out detailed budgeting and 
costing studies in order to better understand how the cost of producing shea butter (with 
either improved or traditional handling methods) varies across (or within) regions.  Also of 
interest would be a detailed study of marketing costs and margins in shea butter 
production, processing, marketing and retailing to help understand how much more of the 
retail share rural women could possibly be expected to earn.  Theses studies may be areas 
of potential future collaboration between Peace Corps, USAID, and universities. 
Research into labor-saving capital and methods in both primary shea nut handling 
and competing agricultural activities should be prioritized in efforts to reduce women’s 
opportunity cost. However, before new technologies are developed, a thorough 
understanding of the reasons for low adoption rates in the past is merited.  In addition, such 
technologies often require imported capital (like solar panels) and cement flooring (see 
Figures 5 and 6) that are both expensive and difficult to come by in rural Mali. To overcome 
this issue, the modified cocoa dryers mentioned above, made of natural and locally 
available fibers, could be widely disseminated at low or no cost to primary producers and 
producer groups by extension agents or local NGOs. Another related area of future 
research may be to develop a method to easily test certain quality parameters at the village   99
level.
67 This will also require identifying which quality parameters matter and for which 
market channel (domestic or for export).  
This research has pointed to the diverse sociological dimensions of shea production 
and consumption. In the future, would be helpful to understand, from a sociological or 
anthropological perspective, some of the motivations and dynamics involved with women’s 
mobilization efforts and group work. Also, this study described the highly objective 
measures and perceptions of shea quality in the West. However, it will be helpful to have a 
greater understanding of the determinants of both producers’ and local consumers’ 
perceptions of shea quality in order to better understand the motivation behind the handling 
choices of producer. This will also be important for the ongoing regional efforts to develop 
grades and standards based on economically important attributes.  
Unlike other shea producing countries, over 75 percent of shea produced in Mali is 
consumed locally. In some cases, shea nuts are exported and processed and shea butter 
(and other value-added products) are then imported from neighboring countries or Western 
Europe. Future research may help to identify the extent to which domestic buyers are 
willing to pay a premium for the handling methods preferred in industrialized nations (a 
function of local perceptions of and willingness to pay for different qualities of shea).   
Finally, some producer groups have already begun producing shea-based soaps for the 
domestic market. This suggests it may be worthwhile to understand the nature and scope 
of the domestic (and West African) demand for alternative value-added products such as 
soaps. The results of these future areas of research along with the implementation of the 
policy recommendations discussed above may help to improve the quality and reputation of 
                                                 
67 Such as FFA levels, for example.    100
shea “made in Mali” — thereby enabling shea to fulfill its potential as a important source of 
rural income growth and help assure that women, throughout the world, benefit from all 
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